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Résumé : Les applications actuelles, des 
systèmes de capteurs complexes (par exemple 
auto quantifiée) aux applications de e-
commerce, acquièrent de grandes quantités 
d’informations personnelles qui sont 
habituellement stockées sur des serveurs 
centraux. Cette quantité massive de données 
personnelles, considéré comme le nouveau 
pétrole, représente un important potentiel pour 
les applications et les entreprises. Cependant, la 
centralisation et le traitement de toutes les 
données sur un serveur unique, où elles sont 
exposées aux indiscrétions de son gestionnaire, 
posent un problème majeur en ce qui concerne 
la vie privée. Inversement, les architectures 
décentralisées aident les individus à conserver 
le plein de contrôle sur leurs données, toutefois 
leurs traitements en particulier le calcul de 
requêtes globales deviennent complexes. Dans 
cette thèse, nous visons à concilier la vie privée 
de l'individu et l'exploitation de ces données, 
 
qui présentent des avantages manifestes pour la 
communauté (comme des études statistiques) ou 
encore des perspectives d’affaires. Nous 
promouvons l'idée de sécuriser l'acquisition des 
données par l'utilisation de matériel sécurisé. 
Grâce à ces éléments matériels tangibles de 
confiance, sécuriser des protocoles 
d'interrogation distribués permet d'effectuer des 
calculs globaux, tels que les agrégats SQL, sans 
révéler d'informations sensibles à des serveurs 
centraux. Cette thèse étudie le sous-groupe de 
requêtes SQL sans jointures et montre comment 
sécuriser leur exécution en présence d'attaquants 
honnêtes-mais-curieux. Cette thèse explique 
également comment les protocoles 
d'interrogation qui en résultent peuvent être 
intégrés concrètement dans une architecture 
décentralisée. Nous démontrons que notre 
approche est viable et peut passer à l'échelle 
d'applications de la taille d'un pays par un 
modèle de coût et des expériences réelles sur 
notre prototype, SQL/AA. 
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 Abstract 
Current applications, from complex sensor systems (e.g. quantified self) to online e-
markets acquire vast quantities of personal information which usually end-up on 
central servers. This massive amount of personal data, the new oil, represents an 
unprecedented potential for applications and business. However, centralizing and 
processing all one’s data in a single server, where they are exposed to prying eyes, 
poses a major problem with regards to privacy concern.  
Conversely, decentralized architectures helping individuals keep full control of their 
data, but they complexify global treatments and queries, impeding the development 
of innovative services. 
In this thesis, we aim at reconciling individual's privacy on one side and global 
benefits for the community and business perspectives on the other side. It promotes 
the idea of pushing the security to secure hardware devices controlling the data at 
the place of their acquisition. Thanks to these tangible physical elements of trust, 
secure distributed querying protocols can reestablish the capacity to perform global 
computations, such as SQL aggregates, without revealing any sensitive information 
to central servers.  
This thesis studies the subset of SQL queries without external joins and shows how 
to secure their execution in the presence of honest-but-curious attackers. It also 
discusses how the resulting querying protocols can be integrated in a concrete 
decentralized architecture. Cost models and experiments on SQL/AA, our distributed 
prototype running on real tamper-resistant hardware, demonstrate that this approach 
can scale to nationwide applications. 
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 Résumé en français 
Les applications actuelles, des systèmes de capteurs complexes (par exemple auto 
quantifiée) aux applications de e-commerce, acquièrent de grandes quantités 
d’informations personnelles qui sont habituellement stockées sur des serveurs 
centraux. Cette quantité massive de données personnelles, considéré comme le 
nouveau pétrole, représente un important potentiel pour les applications et les 
entreprises. Cependant, la centralisation et le traitement de toutes les données sur 
un serveur unique, où elles sont exposées aux indiscrétions de son gestionnaire, 
posent un problème majeur en ce qui concerne la vie privée. 
Inversement, les architectures décentralisées aident les individus à conserver le 
plein de contrôle sur leurs données, toutefois leurs traitements en particulier le calcul 
de requêtes globales deviennent complexes. 
Dans cette thèse, nous visons à concilier la vie privée de l'individu et l'exploitation de 
ces données, qui présentent des avantages manifestes pour la communauté 
(comme des études statistiques) ou encore des perspectives d’affaires. Nous 
promouvons l'idée de sécuriser l'acquisition des données par l'utilisation de matériel 
sécurisé. Grâce à ces éléments matériels tangibles de confiance, sécuriser des 
protocoles d'interrogation distribués permet d'effectuer des calculs globaux, tels que 
les agrégats SQL, sans révéler d'informations sensibles à des serveurs centraux. 
Cette thèse étudie le sous-groupe de requêtes SQL sans jointures et montre 
comment sécuriser leur exécution en présence d'attaquants honnêtes-mais-curieux. 
Cette thèse explique également comment les protocoles d'interrogation qui en 
résultent peuvent être intégrés concrètement dans une architecture décentralisée. 
Nous démontrons que notre approche est viable et peut passer à l'échelle 
d'applications de la taille d'un pays par un modèle de coût et des expériences réelles 
sur notre prototype, SQL/AA. 
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 Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Current applications, from complex sensor systems (e.g. quantified self) to online e-
markets acquire vast quantities of personal information which usually ends-up on 
central servers. Decentralized architectures, devised to help individuals keep full 
control of their data, hinder global treatments and queries, impeding the development 
of services of great interest. To address this challenge, we propose secure 
distributed querying protocols based on the use of a tangible physical element of 
trust, reestablishing the capacity to perform global computations without revealing 
any sensitive information to central servers. Thank to the recent advances in low-
cost secure hardware, mass-storage secure devices are emerging and provide a real 
breakthrough in the management of sensitive data. They can embed personal data 
and/or metadata referencing documents stored encrypted in the Cloud and can 
manage them under the holder’s control. This thesis promotes the idea of pushing 
the security to the edges of applications, through the use of secure hardware devices 
controlling the data at the place of their acquisition. In this chapter, we first position 
the value of personal data in our e-society nowadays; then we list the precise 
objectives of the thesis. Third, we present the main contributions of this thesis. 
Finally, we give an illustrative scenario and the outline of this manuscript. 
1.1 Personal Data & Privacy 
With the convergence of mobile communications, sensors and online social networks 
technologies, we are witnessing an exponential increase in the creation and 
consumption of personal data in today’s digital society. Data is being collected on 
who we are, whom we have relation with, where we were and will be, and what we 
buy, etc. Some data is freely disclosed by users. Some other is transparently 
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 acquired by sensor systems through analog processes (e.g., GPS tracking units, 
smart meters, healthcare sensors) or mechanical interactions (e.g., as simple as 
opening a door or putting a light on). In fine, all this data ends up in servers. This 
massive amount of personal data is so valuable that the World Economic Forum 
calls it "the new oil" [WEF12] since it represents an unprecedented potential for 
applications and business (e.g., car insurance billing, traffic decongestion, smart 
grids optimization, healthcare surveillance, participatory sensing). Mining and 
analyzing this personal data gives us the ability to understand the human’s behavior 
and make profit from this knowledge. For example, to enjoy the “free” services 
(social network, search engine, etc.) supplied by the Internet giants (Facebook, 
Google, etc.), users have to provide them with unlimited free access to their data, 
which they monetize for billions of dollars (e.g., Facebook, is valued at approximately 
$50 per account). Surprisingly, while oil gives a maximum return of $0.5 per year and 
per dollar, US companies spend $2 billion a year on third-party data about individuals, 
with an estimated return around $30 for $1 invested [eMarketer].  
However, centralizing and processing all one’s data in a single server incurs a major 
problem with regards to privacy concerns. As seen with the PRISM affair1 and the 
Gemalto SIM card encryption hack2, the public opinion is starting to wonder whether 
these new services are not bringing us closer to the science fiction dystopias, since 
individuals’ data is carefully scrutinized by governmental agencies and companies in 
charge of processing it [Montjoye12]. Privacy violations also arise from negligence 
and attacks and no current server-based approach, including cryptography based 
and server-side secure hardware [Agrawal02], seems capable of closing the gap. 
Conversely, decentralized architectures (e.g., personal data vault), providing better 
control to the user over the management of her personal data, impede global 
computations by construction. 
This thesis aims to demonstrate that privacy protection and global computation are 
not antagonist and can be reconciled to the best benefit of the individuals, the 
community and the companies. To reach this goal, this thesis capitalizes on a novel 
1http://fas.org/irp/eprint/eu-nsa.pdf : the surveillance program of the United States National Security Agency that 
collects internet communications of foreign nationals from at least nine major US internet companies.    
2The encryption keys to millions of SIM cards, used by dozens of cellular networks in the US and around the 
world, were stolen by the UK and US intelligence communities.    
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 architectural approach called Trusted Cells [Anciaux13]. This approach capitalizes on 
emerging practices and hardware advances representing a sea change in the 
acquisition and protection of personal data. Trusted Cells push the security to the 
edges of the network, through personal data servers [Allard10] running on secure 
smart phones, set-top boxes, plug computers3 or secure portable secure devices4 
forming a global decentralized data platform. Indeed, thanks to the emergence of 
low-cost secure hardware and firmware technologies like ARM TrustZone5, a full 
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) will soon be present in any client device. In 
this thesis, and up to the experiments section, we consider that personal data is 
acquired and/or hosted by secure devices but make no additional assumption 
regarding the technical solution they rely on. 
Global queries definitely make sense in this context. Typically, it would be helpful to 
compute aggregates over smart meters without disclosing individual's raw data (e.g., 
compute the mean energy consumption per time period and district). Identifying 
queries also make sense assuming the identified subjects consent to participate (e.g., 
send an alert to people older than 80 and living in Paris if the number of people 
suffering from flu in France has reached a given threshold). Computing SQL-like 
queries on this distributed infrastructure leads to two major and different problems: 
computing joins between data hosted at different locations and computing 
aggregates over this same data. This thesis addresses the second issue: how to 
compute global queries over decentralized personal data stores while respecting 
users' privacy? Indeed, we believe that the computation of aggregates is central to 
the many novel privacy preserving applications such as smart metering, e-
administration, etc. 
1.2 A decentralized, secure, and general approach 
We address in this thesis the problem of answering SQL queries on a distributed 
infrastructure with strong guarantees of security. To this end, we suggest a radically 
different way of computing SQL queries with three main objectives:  
3http://freedomboxfoundation.org/  
4 http://www.gd-sfs.com/portable-security-secure device  
5 http://www.arm.com/products/processors/technologies/trustzone.php  
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 1. Decentralization: each individual manages his own data, under his control, 
and participates voluntarily in a survey. Hence, the assumption of the trusted 
central server is not necessary anymore.  
2. Security: the protocol ensures that adversary cannot get sensitive data. The 
only information that an adversary can get is a set of encrypted tuples, which 
does not represent any benefit for him.  
3. Generality: the protocol must scale up to nationwide dataset and must not rely 
on a 24/7 availability of all participants. 
Our objective is to make as few restrictions on the computation model as possible. 
We model the information system as a global database formed by the union of a 
mutitude of distributed local data stores (e.g., nation-wide context) and we consider 
regular SQL queries (without external joins involving data from different data stores) 
and a traditional access control model. Hence the context we are targeting is 
different and more general than, (1) querying encrypted outsourced data where 
restrictions are put on the predicates which can be evaluated [Agrawal04, 
Amanatidis07, Popa11, Hacigümüs04], (2) performing privacy-preserving queries 
usually restricted to statistical queries matching differential privacy constraints 
[Fung10, Fayyoumi10] and (3) performing Secure-Multi-Party (SMC) query 
computations which cannot meet both query generality and scalability objectives 
[Kissner05]. 
1.3 Contributions 
The contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows: 
1) We propose different secure query execution techniques to evaluate regular 
SQL “group by” queries over a set of distributed trusted personal data stores, 
and study the range of applicability of these techniques. 
2) We show how these techniques can be integrated in a concrete decentralized 
architecture. 
3) We demonstrate that our approach is compatible with nation-wide contexts 
through a thorough analysis of cost models and performance measurements 
of a prototype running on real secure hardware devices. 
4 
 4) We apply our protocol to MapReduce to support the security aspect of this 
framework. 
In the first contribution of this thesis, we try to explore the design space of the 
protocols by applying a variety of the encryption schemes corresponding to each 
protocol. Then we compare these protocols to see in which scenario each suits best. 
To put these protocols into practice, we integrate them into a concrete architecture, 
leading to the second contribution. In the next contribution, cost models are 
proposed for each method. After conducting the unit test on a development device, 
we calibrate the result of this test to the cost models and compare the performance 
among protocols. To verify the accuracy of the cost models, the prototype running on 
real secure hardware devices are also implemented and its results are compared 
with that of cost models to compute the error rate. Finally, we show that our protocol 
can be applied to the MapReduce to support the security aspect of this framework.     
1.4 Illustrative Context 
To give the reader an overview of our system, this section gives a concrete context 
illustrating the challenges we tackle and their importance. 
In France, there are currently 35 million electricity meters, including 20 million 
mechanical meters, and 15 million electronic meters. Modernization of electricity 
meters is a legal obligation imposed by the European Commission. In a directive of 
2006, they required the meters to be "smart" by 2020. In other words they must allow 
users to control their consumption. The full nationwide rollout of 35 million smart 
meters was set to be completed by the year 2020, with an investment of €5 billion. 
To comply with this requirement, and in conjunction with the Energy Regulation 
Commission, Electricité Réseau Distribution de France (ERDF) is implementing a 
plan to modernize its 35 million electricity meters nationwide6. Those meters will 
generate much more detailed data on energy consumption.  
To reflect the extra granularity of the data, smart meter suppliers must comply with a 
range of privacy requirements that go beyond what are required under the Data 
6http://www.erdf.fr/medias/dossiers_presse/DP_ERDF_210610_1_EN.pdf    
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 Protection Act. Those requirements, imposed as licensing conditions, mean that 
energy suppliers must obtain consumers' consent to collect and use consumption 
data at a level of granularity more detailed than daily reads or to use consumption 
data for marketing purposes. The suppliers can, under the framework, access 
consumption data up a daily level detail but consumers must be given the 
opportunity to opt out of that data collection. 
Apparently, the challenge lies in the contradictory benefit of both parties. On one side, 
ERDF wants to get as much information about electrical usage of residents as it can 
so that it can provide its customers with better services and attractive tariff. On the 
other side, clients do not want to give out so much information about their electrical 
consumption since it can reveal their privacy (e.g., at the 1HZ granularity provided by 
the French Linky power meters, most electrical appliances have a distinctive energy 
signature. It is thus possible to infer from the power meter data inhabitants activities 
[Lam07]).  
 
1.5 Outline 
This thesis is composed of four main parts. The first part includes Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3. Chapter 2 presents the background knowledge necessary to understand 
the approaches proposed and positions it with respect to related works. Chapter 3 
clearly states the problem tackled in this thesis, by formulating the assumptions 
made on the participants, and the way we propose to securely execute the SQL 
queries on the proposed architecture. 
The second part contains Chapter 4 that details the design of our proposed protocols 
and analysis of their correctness and security. 
The third part is composed of Chapters 5 and 6 which focus on the implementation 
and performance evaluation. Chapter 5 concentrates on the implementation issues 
such as access control, fault tolerance, load balance, and key management. This 
chapter also presents the prototype SQL/AA. Then, in Chapter 6, we build an 
analytical cost model to analyze and compare the performance among protocols. We 
also further evaluate the accuracy of the proposed cost model by verifying 
experimentally on real hardware. 
6 
 The fourth part is Chapter 7 in which we apply one of our protocols to the Map 
Reduce to extend the security aspect of this framework.  
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes and proposes some ideas for future work. 
7 
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 Chapter 2  
Background Knowledge & Related Works 
This chapter provides the necessary background knowledge to understand the 
contributions of this thesis. We start by introducing the StreamSQL and the Group By 
clauses in SQL query. Then, we give the background knowledge required for 
understanding the cryptographic primitives used in this work. Specifically, we focus 
on the properties and characteristics of deterministic and probabilistic encryptions, 
the two main encryption schemes used in our protocols. Next, we focus on the ways 
to defend against frequency-based attacks. We also explore other kinds of 
encryptions such as homomorphic encryption, order-preserving encryption. Finally, 
we overview the approaches related to this thesis. We explain why the current 
outsourced database services cannot meet both the performance and security 
requirements. We also point out the limitations of secure multi-party computation and 
statistical database in terms of efficiency and security in our context. We finally 
survey the related approaches that address different security aspects of other 
frameworks.    
2.1 Group By SQL Query & StreamSQL 
Structured Query Language (SQL) is a special-purpose programming language 
designed for managing data held in a relational database management system 
(RDBMS). A query in SQL can consist of up to six clauses as follow: 
SELECT <ATTRIBUTE AND FUNCTION LIST> 
FROM <TABLE LIST> 
[WHERE <CONDITION>] 
[GROUP BY <GROUPING ATTRIBUTE(S)>] 
[HAVING <GROUP CONDITION>] 
[ORDER BY <ATTRIBUTE LIST>]; 
9 
 Answering the queries with only Select-From-Where clauses is quite simple. So, this 
thesis deals with a more challenging problem: computing aggregate functions (i.e., 
including the Group By clause) in a distributed manner. In this section, we focus on 
the Group By clauses.  
In SQL, an aggregate function is a function where the values of multiple rows are 
grouped together as input on certain criteria to return a single value. SQL offers 
several aggregate functions as follows: 
• MAX: Compute the maximum element of some data set. 
• MIN: Compute the minimum element of some data set. 
• COUNT: Compute the number of elements in some data set. 
• SUM: Compute the sum of all values in some data set. 
• AVG: Compute the average of all values in some data set. 
• VAR: Compute the variance of all values in some data set. 
• RANK(x): Compute the rank of a given element x in some data set. 
• MEDIAN: Compute the median element of some data set. 
• SMALLEST(k): Given a parameter k, compute the kth smallest element of 
some data set. 
• LARGEST(k): Given a parameter k, compute the kth largest element of some 
data set. 
• DISTINCT: Compute the number of distinct elements in some data set. 
• MODE: Compute the element that occurs most often in some data set.  
All functions mentioned, and combinations thereof, cover a wide range of reasonable 
aggregation queries. Moreover, all discussed aggregate functions are traditionally 
categorized into three classes [Locher09]: Distributive Aggregate Function, Algebraic 
Aggregate Function, and Holistic Aggregate Function. 
Aggregate functions belonging to the first class are called distributive. Given a 
partition S1, . . . , Sn of S, a distributive aggregate function f has the property that the 
aggregates f(S1), . . . , f(Sn) can be used to compute f(S). Formally, distributive 
aggregate functions are defined as follows. 
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 Definition (Distributive Aggregate Function). Let S be a multiset and let S1, . . . , 
Sn be a partition of S. An aggregate function f is called distributive if there is an 
aggregate function g such that f(S) = g(f(S1), . . . , f(Sn)). 
As the name suggests, distributive aggregate functions can easily be computed 
distributively since partial solutions can be combined by means of a function g. 
Distributive aggregate functions are for example COUNT, MAX, MIN, SUM, and 
RANK. Apart from COUNT and RANK, it holds for these functions that the function g 
that joins the partial aggregates together is the same as the function f (For example, 
MAX(S) = MAX(MAX(S1),. . . ,MAX(Sn))). For the aggregate function COUNT the 
function g is simply the aggregate function SUM. If we only consider the multisets 
S’1 , . . . , S’r that contain element x, the rank of x in S is RANK(x, S) = SUM(RANK(x, 
S’1),. . . ,RANK(x, S’r))−r + 1. 
The second class of aggregate functions consists of the functions that can be 
computed by combining distributive aggregate functions. If f(S) can be derived from 
the results of distributive aggregate functions for any multiset S, then f is referred to 
as an algebraic aggregate function. 
Definition (Algebraic Aggregate Function). An aggregate function f is called 
algebraic, if it can be computed with a fixed number of distributive aggregate 
functions. 
The function AVG, which computes the average of all elements in S, is an algebraic 
aggregate function. Once SUM and COUNT have been computed, we get the 
average value by simply dividing these values. The function VAR is an algebraic 
aggregate function as well. 
Algebraic aggregate functions are by definition not (much) harder to compute than 
distributive aggregate functions. In both cases it is possible to exploit the fact that 
sub-aggregates can be merged into the desired aggregate value. The third class 
distinguishes itself quite clearly from the other classes in this regard. An aggregate 
function is said to be holistic if it is not possible to combine sub-aggregates. 
Definition (Holistic Aggregate Function). An aggregate function f is called holistic, 
if there is no constant bound on the size of the storage needed to describe a sub-
aggregate. 
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 Intuitively, a holistic aggregate function is a function that can only be computed by 
looking at each element individually. Since all functions that cannot be computed by 
combining sub-aggregates are considered holistic, the classification of aggregate 
functions into these three categories is exhaustive. The remaining aggregate 
functions, i.e., MEDIAN, SMALLEST(k), LARGEST(k), DISTINCT, and MODE, all 
belong to this class.   
The fact that sub-aggregates cannot be used directly to compute the final aggregate 
entails that holistic functions are considerably more difficult to compute than 
distributive and algebraic aggregate functions. 
In our architecture, each secure device computes part of the aggregate function. In 
order to compute the holistic functions, all data must be gathered in one place and 
then comparing each element individually. In other words, the holistic aggregate 
functions cannot be easily computed in a distributed way and therefore it does not fit 
on our distributed architecture. So, in this work, we focus on the distributive and 
algebraic aggregate functions and let holistic ones for future work. 
StreamSQL [StreamSQL15] is a query language that extends SQL with the ability to 
manipulate real-time data streams, which are infinite sequences of tuples that are 
not all available at the same time. They are essentially all SQL extensions that 
incorporate a notion of a window on a stream as a way to convert an infinite stream 
into a finite relation in order to apply relational operators. In other words, a stream 
can be windowed to create finite sets of tuples (e.g., a window of size 5 minutes 
would contain all the tuples in a given 5 minutes period). Because of this extended 
feature, a StreamSQL query can be in this form:  
SELECT STREAM [ALL | DISTINCT] select_expr, 
Analytic_function(select_expr) [OVER] window_als 
FROM stream_reference 
[WHERE where_condition] 
[GROUP BY col_list] 
[WINDOW window_als AS (RANGE)] 
Queries of interest. We consider that local databases hosted by distributed devices 
conform to a common schema which can be queried in SQL. For example, power 
meter data (resp., GPS traces, healthcare records, etc) can be stored in one or 
several table(s) whose schema is defined by the national distribution company (resp., 
an insurance company consortium, the Ministry of Health, etc) horizontally 
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 partitioned on the local stores. Queries are regular SQL queries, borrowing the SIZE 
clause from the definition of windows in the StreamSQL standard as mentioned 
above. For example, an energy distribution company could issue the following query 
on customers' smart meters. 
SELECT C.district, AVG(Cons) 
FROM Power P, Consumer C  
WHERE C.accomodation='detached house' 
 and C.cid = P.cid 
GROUP BY C.district 
HAVING Count(distinct C.cid) > 100  
SIZE current_date() <= 2014-04-1 
This query computes the mean energy consumption of people living in a detached 
house, grouped by district, for districts where over 100 consumers answered the poll. 
The poll is open until the 1st of April 2014. 
In the example presented above, only the smart meter of customers who opt-in for 
this service will participate in the computation. Needless to say that the querier, that 
is the distribution company, must be prevented from seeing the raw data of its 
customers for privacy concerns. In terms of privacy protection, the querying 
protocol must guarantee that (1) the Querier gains access only to the final result of 
authorized queries, as in a traditional database systems and (2) intermediate results 
stored in SSI are fully obfuscated. The first requirement follows the regular access 
control model in which each Querier with appropriate privileges is granted access to 
specific views of the database. These views are the results of the SQL queries. In 
our context, they are the results of the Group By StreamSQL queries, meaning that 
the Queriers can see only the final aggregated results of the queries (but not the raw 
data of each participant).   
2.2 Cryptographic tools  
As stated in chapter 1, the objective of this thesis is to perform global computations 
by hiding the sensitive information from untrusted servers. Whatever the 
architectures and solutions proposed, personal data need to be externalized and 
therefore must be protected by cryptographic tools. As seen in following chapters, 
corresponding to each encryption scheme (and therefore the level of security), there 
are different types of computations that can be done on them and leads to different 
13 
 performance. Due to their important role, various types of encryption schemes are 
used in this thesis. We review these kinds of encryptions in this section.  
2.2.1 Deterministic Encryption and Frequency-based Attacks 
Deterministic Encryption 
The first, also the simplest one, is the deterministic encryption scheme [Bellare07] 
that always produces the same ciphertext for a given plaintext and key, even over 
separate executions of the encryption algorithm. Examples of deterministic 
encryption algorithms include the RSA cryptosystem (without encryption padding), 
and many block ciphers when used in ECB mode.  
Formal definition of deterministic encryption: A deterministic encryption scheme П = 
(K, Ԑ, Ŋ) is specified by three polynomial-time algorithms (i.e., Key Generation, 
Encryption, Decryption) as follows. 
Key Generation (sk,pk) <- K(1k): on input a security parameter k expressed in the 
unary representation 1k, the key generation algorithm outputs a public key pk and a 
matching secret key sk. The pk includes a description of finite message space M and 
a finite ciphertext space C. 
Encryption c <- Ԑ(pk,m): on input pk and a message m ϵ M, the deterministic 
encryption algorithm Ԑ outputs a ciphertext c ϵ C. 
Decryption m <- Ŋ(sk,c): on input a secret key sk and a ciphertext c, the decryption 
algorithm outputs a message m ϵ M. 
While deterministic encryption permits logarithmic time search on encrypted data, it 
is easy to detect if a message is sent twice, opening the door for frequency-based 
attacks. 
Frequency-based attacks 
The frequency-based attack is a type of attack that exploits additional adversary 
knowledge of domain values and/or their exact/approximate frequencies to crack the 
encrypted data. To cope with frequency-based attacks, the straightforward 1-to-1 
substitution encryption functions (e.g., deterministic encryption) are not sufficient. For 
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 example, to protect user privacy in location-based services, their locations will be 
encrypted in the storage. However, a 1-to-1 encryption scheme on locations is not 
secure, as the attacker can map the encrypted data values of the highest frequency 
to the popular locations easily. In reality, the attacker may possess approximate 
knowledge of the frequencies or may know the exact/approximate supports of a 
subset of data values in the network. 
If the attacker knows the exact frequency of plaintext data values and utilizes such 
knowledge to crack the data encryption by matching the encrypted data values with 
original data values based on their frequency distribution. Therefore, our data 
encryption strategy aims to transform the original frequency distribution of the 
original data (i.e., plaintext) to a uniform distribution of the encrypted data (i.e., 
ciphertext) so that the attacker cannot derive the mapping relationship between 
encrypted data and original data based on her knowledge of domain values and their 
occurrence frequency.   
Previous works [Wong07; Molloy09] consider how to defend against the frequency-
based attack in the data-mining-as-service paradigm (i.e., the data mining 
computations are outsourced to a third-party service provider). For example, Wong 
et al. [Wong07] propose a substitution cipher technique on transactional data for 
secure outsourcing of association rule mining. It deploys a one-to-n item mapping 
that transforms transactions non-deterministically. However, the mapping scheme 
has potential security flaws; Molloy et al. [Molloy09] introduce an attack that could 
break the encoding scheme in [Wong07]. Some other works [Wang06; Agrawal04] 
consider the frequency-based attack in the scenario of the database-as-service 
paradigm. The basic idea is to transform the dataset in a way that, no matter what 
the frequency distribution of the cleartext dataset is, the ciphertext values always 
follow some given target distribution. Therefore, the attacker cannot decide the 
mapping relationship between plaintext and ciphertext values by the frequency of 
plaintext and ciphertext values. Wang and Lakshmanan [Wang06] propose an 
approach that could transform the original occurrence frequency distribution of 
plaintext into a uniform distribution. Agrawal et al. [Agrawal04] proposes to transform 
the original occurrence frequency distribution to a certain target distribution, such as 
Gaussian distribution. However, all of these works coped with the frequency-based 
attack in a centralized framework; none of the works can be applied directly to 
distributed data storage of wireless networks.  
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 This kind of attack inspired the development of probabilistic encryption schemes by 
Goldwasser and Micali [Goldwasser84]. 
2.2.2 Probabilistic (Non-deterministic) Encryption 
Probabilistic encryption is the use of randomness in an encryption algorithm, so that 
when encrypting the same message several times it will, in general, yield different 
ciphertexts. The first provably-secure probabilistic public-key encryption scheme was 
proposed by Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali, based on the hardness of the 
quadratic residuosity problem and had a message expansion factor equal to the 
public key size. Example of probabilistic encryption using any trapdoor permutation: 
Enc(x) = (f(r), x XOR b(r)) 
Dec(y, z) = b(f-1(y)) XOR z 
With x - single bit plaintext; f - trapdoor permutation (deterministic encryption 
algorithm); b - hard core predicate of f; r - random string 
Example of probabilistic encryption in the random oracle model: 
Enc(x) = (f(r), x XOR h(r)) 
Dec(y, z) = h(f-1(y)) XOR z 
With h being random oracle (typically implemented using a publicly specified hash 
function). 
Deterministic encryption permits logarithmic time search on encrypted data, while 
probabilistic encryption only allows linear time search [Boneh04, Song00], meaning a 
search requires scanning the whole database. This difference is crucial for large 
outsourced databases which cannot afford to slow down search. Of course 
deterministic encryption cannot achieve the classical notions of security of 
randomized encryption due to its inability to hide the original frequency distribution of 
the plaintext domain, especially if the plaintext domain has the skewed frequency 
distribution. Deterministic encryption leaks equality and is only semantically secure if 
it can ensure that the way the data is structured prevents redundant information (e.g., 
if the original frequency distribution is uniform). For example, to encrypt user 
16 
 information, the user's id and username would be encrypted deterministically to allow 
fast retrieval on these attributes; the rest of their information would be encrypted 
probabilistically. Since user’s ids and usernames are always unique, the adversary 
cannot derive any knowledge (besides length / block size) from the encryptions.  
Despite its high security due to its randomness, it is impossible to perform 
computation on non-deterministically encrypted data without decrypting it (also 
because of its randomness). Related works [Agrawal04, Gentry09, Hacigumus02] 
introduce some encryption schemes and obfuscation techniques that allow 
operations to be performed on encrypted data as if it were still in its plaintext form. 
We review these encryption schemes in the next section.  
2.2.3 Other Encryption Scheme 
Beside the deterministic and non-deterministic encryptions which are the two 
principal encryptions used in our thesis, there are some other kinds of encryptions 
that can help compute directly on encrypted data to some extent.  
Order-preserving encryptions  
Order-preserving encryptions [Agrawal04, Boldyreva09] are deterministic encryption 
schemes whose encryption function preserves numerical ordering of the plaintexts. 
The reason for interest in such schemes is that they allow efficient range queries on 
encrypted data.  
Formally, for A,B ⊆ N with |A| ≤ |B|, a function f : A → B is order-preserving if for all i, j 
∈ A, f(i) > f(j) iff i > j. We say that deterministic encryption scheme SE = (Ҡ, Enc, Dec) 
with plaintext and ciphertext-spaces D, R is order-preserving if Enc(K, ·) is an order-
preserving function from D to R for all K output by Ҡ (with elements of D,R 
interpreted as numbers, encoded as strings). 
Homomorphic encryption  
The homomorphic encryption [Gentry09] is a form of encryption where one can 
perform a specific algebraic operation on the plaintext by performing a (possibly 
different) algebraic operation on the ciphertext.  
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 Informally speaking, a homomorphic cryptosystem is a cryptosystem with the 
additional property that there exists an efficient algorithm to compute an encryption 
of a function, of two messages given the public key and the encryptions of the 
messages but not the messages themselves. 
Formal definition of Homomorphic Property: A is an algorithm that on input 1k, ke, 
and elements c1,c2 ϵ C outputs an element c3 ϵ C so that for all m1,m2 ϵ M it holds: if 
m3 = m1 o m2 and c1=E(1k,ke,m1), and c2=E(1k,ke,m2), then Prob[D(A(1k,ke,c1,c2))] 
≠ m3 ] is negligible. 
There are two kinds of homomorphic cryptosystems: partially and fully homomorphic 
encryption.  
Partially Homomorphic Encryption: allow homomorphic computation of some 
operations on ciphertexts (e.g., additions, multiplications, quadratic functions, etc.). 
Fully Homomorphic Encryption: A cryptosystem that supports arbitrary computation 
on ciphertexts is known as fully homomorphic encryption and is far more powerful. 
Such a scheme enables the construction of programs for any desirable functionality, 
which can be run on encrypted inputs to produce an encryption of the result. 
However, the performance of fully homomorphic encryption is still a big problem and 
therefore it cannot be applicable in real applications [Tu13].  
Bucketization-based techniques  
Besides encrypting the actual data using some semantically secure encryption 
algorithm like AES or homomorphic encryption, an alternative approach is to use 
data partitioning (also known as bucketization in the literature). Bucketization can be 
seen as a generalized partitioning algorithm that induces indistinguishability among 
data in a controlled manner. Here, the data are first partitioned into buckets and the 
bucket-id is set as the tag for each data item in the bucket. Hacigumus et al. 
[Hacigumus02] were the first ones to propose the bucketization-based data 
representation for query processing in an untrusted environment. Their bucketization 
was simply a data partitioning step similar to those used for histogram construction 
(e.g., equi-depth, equi-width partitioning, etc.) followed by assignment of a random 
(index) tag to each bucket effectively making every element within a bucket 
indistinguishable from another. 
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 Generally speaking, a histogram on attribute is constructed by partitioning the data 
distribution D into mutually disjoint β subsets called buckets and approximating the 
frequencies f and values V in each bucket in some common fashion. The simplest 
type of histograms is the traditional equi-width histogram, in which the input value 
range is subdivided into buckets having the same width, and then the count of items 
in each bucket is reported. Knowing the minimum and maximum values of the data, 
the equi-width histograms are the easiest to implement both in databases and in data 
streams. However, for many practical applications, such as fitting a distribution 
function or optimizing queries, equi-width histograms may not provide useful enough 
information [Greenwald96]. A better choice for these applications is an Equi-depth 
histogram [Greenwald96, Muralikrishna88] (also known as equi-height or equi-
probable) in which the goal is to partition data into buckets such that the number of 
tuples in each bucket is the same. This type of histograms is more effective than 
equi-width histograms particularly for the data sets with skewed distributions 
[Ioannidis03]. 
Other types of histograms proposed in the literature include the following: (i) V-
Optimal Histograms [Guha01, Jagadish98] that estimate the ordered input as a step-
function (or pairwise linear function) with a specific number of steps, (ii) MaxDiff 
histograms [Poosala96] which aim to find the B − 1 largest gaps (boundaries) in the 
sorted list of input, and (iii) Compressed histograms [Poosala96] which place the 
highest frequency values in singleton buckets and use equi-width histogram for the 
rest of input data. This third type can be used to construct biased histograms 
[Cormode06]. Although these type of histograms can be more accurate than the 
other histograms, they are more expensive to construct and update incrementally 
[Halim09].   
2.3 Related Works on Querying Outsourced Databases 
This work has connections with related studies in different domains, namely 
protection of outsourced (personal) databases, statistical databases and secures 
aggregation in sensor networks. We review these works below. 
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 2.3.1 Querying Encrypted Databases 
Outsourced database services or Database-as-a-Service (DaaS) [Hacigumus02] 
allow users to store sensitive data on a remote, untrusted server and retrieve desired 
parts of it on request. Many works have addressed the security of DaaS by 
encrypting the data at rest and pushing part of the processing to the server side. 
Searchable encryption has been studied in the symmetric-key [Amanatidis07] and 
public-key [Bellare07] settings but these works focus mainly on simple exact-match 
queries and introduce a high computing cost. Agrawal et al. [Agrawal04] proposed an 
order preserving encryption scheme (OPES), which ensures that the order among 
plaintext data is preserved in the ciphertext domain, supporting range and aggregate 
queries, but OPES relies on the strong assumption that all plaintexts in the database 
are known in advance and order-preserving is usually synonym of weaker security. 
The assumption on the a priori knowledge of all plaintext is not always practical (e.g., 
in our highly distributed database context, users do not know all plaintexts a priori), 
so a stateless scheme whose encryption algorithm can process single plaintexts on 
the fly is more practical.  
Bucketization-based techniques [Hacigumus02, Hore12] use distributional properties 
of the dataset to partition data and design indexing techniques that allow 
approximate queries over encrypted data. Unlike cryptographic schemes that aim for 
exact predicate evaluation, bucketization admits false positives while ensuring all 
matching data is retrieved. A post-processing step is required at the client-side to 
weed out the false positives. These techniques often support limited types of queries 
and lack of a precise analysis of the performance/security tradeoff introduced by the 
indexes. To overcome this limitation, the work in [Damiani03] quantitatively measures 
the resulting inference exposure.  
Other works introduce solutions to compute basic arithmetic over encrypted data, but 
homomorphic encryption [Paillier99] supports only range queries, fully homomorphic 
encryption [Gentry09] is unrealistic in terms of time, and privacy homomorphism 
[Hacigumus04] is insecure under ciphertext-only attacks [Mykletun06]. In terms of 
utility and security, the best approach would be to consider theoretical solution, the 
fully homomorphic encryption [Gentry09], which allows servers to compute arbitrary 
functions over encrypted data, while only clients see decrypted data. However, this 
construction is prohibitively expensive in practice, requiring slowdowns on the order 
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 of 109× [Tu13]. In term of performance, CryptDB [Popa11] is a system that provides 
provable confidentiality by executing SQL queries over encrypted data using a 
collection of efficient SQL-aware encryption schemes. However, this system is not 
completely secure since it still uses some weak encryption schemes (e.g., 
deterministic encryption, order-preserving encryption [Boldyreva09]). 
Recently, the Monomi system [Tu13] has been proposed for securely executing 
analytical workloads over sensitive data on an untrusted database server. Although 
this system can execute complex queries with a median overhead of only 1.24× 
compared to an un-encrypted database, there can be only one trusted client 
decrypting data, and therefore it cannot enjoy the benefit of parallel computing. 
Another limitation of this system is that to perform the GROUP BY or equi-join 
queries, it still uses some weak encryption schemes (e.g., deterministic encryption). 
Hence, optimal performance/security tradeoff for outsourced databases is still 
regarded as the Holy Grail. 
Some works [Bajaj11, Arasu14] deploy the secure hardware at server side to ensure 
the confidentiality of the system. By leveraging server-hosted tamper-proof hardware, 
[Bajaj11] designs TrustedDB, a trusted hardware based relational database with full 
data confidentiality and no limitations on query expressiveness. TrustedDB utilizes 
tamper resistant hardware such as the IBM 4764/5 cryptographic coprocessors 
deployed on the service provider’s side to implement a complete SQL database 
processing engine. Although tamper resistant hardware provides a secure execution 
environment, it is significantly constrained in both computational ability and memory 
capacity which makes implementing fully featured database solutions using secure 
coprocessors very challenging. TrustedDB overcomes these limitations by utilizing 
resources of untrusted server to the maximum extent possible. This eliminates the 
limitations on the size of databases that can be supported. Moreover, client queries 
are pre-processed to identify sensitive components to be run inside the secure CPU. 
Non-sensitive operations are off-loaded to the untrusted server. However, TrustedDB 
does not deploy any parallel processing, limiting its performance. [Arasu14] also 
bases on the trusted hardware to securely decrypt data on the server and perform 
computations in plaintext. In this setting, since the data access pattern from 
untrusted storage has the potential to reveal sensitive information, they present 
oblivious query processing algorithms so that an adversary observing the query 
execution learns nothing about the underlying database. 
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 Even equipped with secure hardware on server with strong encryption, these works 
do not solve the two intrinsic problems of centralized approaches. First, users get 
exposed to sudden changes in privacy policies by the managing infrastructures; their 
data can also be unexpectedly exposed by negligence or because it is regulated by 
too weak policies. Second, users are exposed to sophisticated attacks, whose cost-
benefit is high on a centralized database [Anciaux13] (i.e., a successful attack 
compromises all the data stored in the centralized server while on the decentralized 
approaches, adversary steals only the portion of data stored in that site). In contrast, 
decentralized approaches return complete control of users on their data and 
drastically reduce the benefits/cost ratio of an attack. 
2.3.2 Querying Statistical Databases 
Statistical databases (SDB) [Fayyoumi10] are motivated by the desire to compute 
statistics without compromising sensitive information about individuals. This requires 
trusting the server to perform query restriction or data perturbation, to produce the 
approximate results, and to deliver them to untrusted queriers. Thus, the SDB model 
is orthogonal to our context since (1) it assumes a trusted third party (i.e., the SDB 
server) and (2) it usually produces approximate results to prevent queriers from 
conducting inferential attack [Fayyoumi10].  
2.3.3 Querying Sensor Network 
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) [Alzaid08] consist of sensor nodes with limited 
power, computation, storage, sensing and communication capabilities. In WSN, an 
aggregator node can compute the sum, average, minimum or maximum of the data 
from its children sensors, and send the aggregation results to a higher-level 
aggregator. WSN have some connection with our context regarding the computation 
of distributed aggregations. However, contrary to our context, WSN nodes are highly 
available, can communicate with each other in order to form a network topology to 
optimize calculations (In fact, secure devices can collaborate to form the topology 
through untrusted server, but because of the weak connectivity of secure devices, 
forming the topology is inefficient in term of time). Other work [Castelluccia05] uses 
additively homomorphic encryption for computing aggregation function on encrypted 
data in WSN but fails to consider queries with GROUP BY clauses. Liu et al. [Liu10] 
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 protects data against frequency-based attacks but considers only point and range 
queries.  
2.4 Other Secure Computation Frameworks 
Not restricted to SQL, this section reviews the works allowing other forms of 
computations such as privacy-preserving data publishing, secure multi-party 
computation, and Map/Reduce framework.  
2.4.1 Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing 
Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) [Fung10] provides a non trusted user 
with some sanitized data produced by an anonymization process such as k-
anonymity, l-diversity or differential privacy to cite the most common ones [Fung10]. 
Similarly, PPDP is orthogonal to our context since it again assumes a trusted third 
party (i.e., the publisher) and produces sanitized data of lower quality to match the 
information exposure dictated by a specific privacy model. The work in [Allard14] 
tackles the first limitation by pushing the trust to secure clients but keeps the 
objective of producing sanitized releases. Contrary to these works, our thesis targets 
the execution of general SQL queries, considers a traditional access control model 
and does not rely on a secure server. 
2.4.2 Secure multi-party computation 
Secure multi-party computation (SMC) allows N parties to share a computation in 
which each party learns only what can be inferred from their own inputs (which can 
then be kept private) and the output of the computation. This problem is represented 
as a combinatorial circuit which depends on the size of the input. The resulting cost 
of a SMC protocol depends on the number of inter-participant interactions, which in 
turn depends exponentially on the size of the input data, on the complexity of the 
initial function, and on the number of participants. Despite their unquestionable 
theoretical interest, generic SMC approaches are impractical where inputs are large 
and the function to be computed complex. Ad-hoc SMC protocols have been 
proposed [Kissner05] to solve specific problems/functions but they lack of generality 
and usually make strong assumptions on participants’ availability. Hence, SMC is 
badly adapted to our context. 
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 2.4.3 Security in MapReduce Framework 
The related works address different security aspects of MapReduce as follows. 
MAC and differential privacy 
[Roy10] proposes the Airavat that integrates mandatory access control with 
differential privacy in MapReduce framework. Since Airavat adds noise to the output 
in the reduce function to achieve differential privacy, it requires that reducers must be 
trusted. Furthermore, the types of computation supported by Airavat are limited (e.g., 
SUM, COUNT). If they want to support more kinds of computation, the mappers must 
also be trusted. The other drawback of Airavat is that the security mechanisms, 
including the integrity verification mechanisms, are implemented inside the open 
infrastructure, that is, they are still services provided by the infrastructure. Hence, 
their trustworthiness (i.e. whether they are enforced as expected) should still be 
verified. Although Airavat does not trust the computation provider who writes the map 
and reduce functions, it does trust the cloud provider and the cloud computing 
infrastructure. Finally, they have to modify the original MapReduce framework to 
support the mandatory access control.  
Integrity verification 
In other directions, [Wei09] replicates some map/reduce tasks and assigns them to 
different mappers/reducers to validate the integrity of map/reduce tasks. Any 
inconsistent intermediate results from those mappers/reducers reveal attacks. 
However, even if those malicious mappers/reducers ensure the data integrity, they 
cannot preserve the data privacy since the mappers/reducers directly access 
sensitive data in cleartexts. Recent research [Ruan12] also focuses on integrity 
verification, but missing the data privacy. So, these works are orthogonal to ours in 
which we aim at protecting the data privacy.  
Data anonymization 
[Zhang14b] claims that it is challenging to process large-scale data to satisfy k-
anonymity in a tolerable elapsed time. So they anonymize data sets via 
generalization to satisfy k-anonymity requirement in a highly scalable way using 
MapReduce. Data sets are partitioned and anonymized in parallel in the first phase, 
24 
 producing intermediate results. Then, the intermediate results are merged and 
further anonymized to produce consistent k-anonymous data sets in the second 
phase.     
Hybrid Cloud 
In stating that the data can be classified into secure and public data, some works 
[Zhang11, Zhang14a] propose the hybrid cloud including the private cloud and the 
public cloud. The main idea is to split the task, keeping the computation on the 
private data within an organization’s private cloud while moving the rest to the public 
commercial cloud. Sedic, proposed in [Zhang11], automatically partitions a job 
according to the security levels of the data and tries to outsource as much workload 
to the public commercial cloud as possible, given sensitive data always stay on the 
private cloud. However, this solution requires that reduction operations must be 
associative and the original MapReduce framework must be modified. Also, the 
sanitization approach taken by Sedic does not fit well with chained or iterative MR, 
may still reveal relative locations and length of sensitive data, which could lead to 
crucial information leakage in certain applications [Zhang14a]. To overcome this 
weakness, [Zhang14a] proposes tagged-MapReduce that augments each key-value 
pair in MR with a sensitivity tag. However, both solutions are not suitable for 
MapReduce job where all data is sensitive and/or data owner does not want to reveal 
any data.  
Encrypting part of dataset 
In arguing that encrypting all data sets in the Cloud is not effective, [Zhang13] 
proposes an approach to identify which intermediate data sets need to be encrypted 
while others are in cleartexts, in order to be cost-effective while the privacy 
requirements of data holders can still be satisfied. The main idea is that the data with 
high frequency of accessing will be encrypted while the others are unencrypted. This 
solution is not suitable for the case where all data have the same frequency of 
accessing or data owner does not want to reveal even a single tuple to the untrusted 
Cloud.  
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 Other works supporting very specific operations 
Other works support very specific operations. [Blass12a] searches encrypted key-
words on the Cloud so that the cloud must not learn any information about the 
content it hosts and search queries performed. [Blass12b] presents EPiC to count 
the number of occurrences of a pattern specified by user in an oblivious manner on 
the untrusted cloud. In contrast to these works, our work addresses more general 
problems, supporting any kind of operations. 
To the best of our knowledge, no state-of-the-art MapReducre works can satisfy the 
three requirements of security, utility, performance and our TrustedMR proposed in 
Chapter 7 is the first MapReduce-based proposal, that inherits the strong privacy 
guarantees from [To14], achieving a secure solution to process large-scale 
encrypted data using a large set of tamper-resistant hardware with low performance 
overhead. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we first overviewed SQL queries, focusing on the Group By clause. 
Then, StreamSQL was introduced, and the window concept of this kind of query was 
emphasized due to the close relation with our interested query throughout this thesis. 
After the listing of various types of encryption schemes which play important role in 
this thesis, we reviewed different domains that apply these encryption schemes to 
protect the data from untrusted server. 
With these constraints in mind, we then survey the state of the art that use these 
encryption schemes to conceal the sensitive data from the untrusted server, and find 
that none of them could meet all the requirements of security and efficiency.  
As a conclusion, and to the best of our knowledge, our work presented in this thesis 
is the first proposal achieving a fully distributed and secure solution to compute 
aggregate SQL queries over a large set of participants. 
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 Chapter 3  
Problem Statement 
In this chapter, we illustrate the Trusted Data Server (TDS) vision through different 
scenarios motivating our approach, and present the hypothesis related to the 
security of TDSs and of the queries that we are interested in. Next, we describe the 
asymmetric architecture, the role of a supporting server in this architecture, the 
threat model, and define correctness and security under this threat model. Finally, we 
give the problem statement.  
3.1 Scenarios and Queries of Interest 
As discussed in [Anciaux13], trusted hardware is more and more versatile and has 
become a key enabler for all applications where trust is required at the edges of the 
network. Figure 1 depicts different scenarios where a Trusted Data Server (TDS) is 
called to play a central role, by reestablishing the capacity to perform global 
computations without revealing any sensitive information to central servers. TDS can 
be integrated in energy smart meters to gather energy consumption raw data, to 
locally perform aggregate queries for billing or smart grid optimization purpose and 
externalize only certified results, thereby reconciling individuals' privacy and energy 
providers’ benefits. Green button7 is another application example where individuals 
accept sharing their data with their neighborhood through distributed queries for their 
personal benefit. Similarly, TDS can be integrated in GPS trackers to protect 
individuals' privacy while securely computing insurance fees or carbon tax and 
participating in general interest distributed services such as traffic jam reduction. 
Moreover, TDSs can be hosted in personal devices to implement secure personal 
7 http://www.greenbuttondata.org/  
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 folders like e.g., PCEHR (Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record) fed by the 
individuals themselves thanks to the Blue Button initiative8 and/or quantified-self 
devices. Distributed queries are useful in this context to help epidemiologists 
performing global surveys or allow patients suffering from the same illness to share 
their data in a controlled manner. 
 
Figure 1: Different scenarios of TDSs 
For the sake of generality, we make no assumption about how the data is actually 
gathered by TDSs, this point being application dependent [Allard10, Montjoye12]. 
We simply consider that local databases conform to a common schema (Figure 3) 
which can be queried in SQL. For example, power meter data (resp., GPS traces, 
healthcare records, etc) can be stored in one (or several) table(s) whose schema is 
defined by the national distribution company (resp., insurance company consortium, 
Ministry of Health 9 , specific administration, etc). Since raw data can be highly 
sensitive, it must also be protected by an access control policy defined either by the 
producer organism, by the legislator or by a consumer association. Depending on 
the scenario, each individual may also opt-in/out of a particular query. For sake of 
generality again, we consider that each TDS participating in a distributed query 
protocol enforces at the same time the access control policy protecting the local data 
8 http://healthit.gov/patients-families/your-health-data   
9 This is the case in France for instance. 
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 it hosts, with no additional consideration for the access control model itself, the 
choice of this model being orthogonal to this study. Hence, the objective is to let 
queriers (users) query this decentralized database exactly as if it were centralized, 
without restricting the expressive power of the language to statistical queries as in 
many PPDP works [Fayyoumi10, Popa11]. 
Consequently, we assume that the querier can issue the following form of SQL 
queries 10 , borrowing the SIZE clause from the definition of windows in the 
StreamSQL standard [StreamSQL15]. This clause is used to indicate a maximum 
number of tuples to be collected, and/or a collection duration.  
For example, an energy distribution company would like to issue the following query 
on its customers' smart meters:  
SELECT AVG(Cons)  
FROM Power P, Consumer C  
WHERE C.accomodation='detached house' and C.cid = P.cid  
GROUP BY C.district  
HAVING Count(distinct C.cid) > 100  
SIZE 50000   
This query computes the mean energy consumption of consumers living in a 
detached home grouped by district, for districts where over 100 consumers 
answered the poll and the poll stops after having globally received at least 50.000 
answers. The semantics of the query are the same as those of a stream relational 
query [Abadi03]. Only the smart meter of customers who opt-in for this service will 
participate in the computation. Needless to say that the querier, that is the 
distribution company, must be prevented to see the raw data of its customers for 
privacy concerns11. 
10 As stated in the introduction, we do not consider joins between data stored in 
different TDSs in this thesis. However, joins which can be executed locally by each 
TDS are supported. 
11 At the 1HZ granularity provided by the French Linky power meters, most electrical 
appliances have a distinctive energy signature. It is thus possible to infer from the 
power meter data inhabitants activities [Lam et al. 2007]. 
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 In other scenarios where TDSs are seldom connected (e.g., querying mobile 
PCEHR), the time to collect the data is probably going to be quite large. Therefore 
the challenge is not on the overall response time, but rather to show that the query 
computation on the collected data is tractable in reasonable time, given local 
resources. 
Also note that our semantics make the Open World Assumption:  since we assume 
that data is not replicated over TDS, many true tuples will not be collected during the 
specified period and/or due to the limit, both indicated in the SIZE clause. 
3.2 Trusted Data Server 
In the context of this thesis, the records of each individual are primarily hosted by the 
individual's secure device. Whatever their form factor, secure devices are usually 
composed of a tamper-resistant micro-controller connected by a bus to a gigabytes 
size external secondary storage area (see Figure 2). We describe below the 
properties that we expect a secure device to exhibit.  
High Security Guarantees.  
A secure device provides a trustworthy computing environment. This property relies 
on the following security guarantees provided by a secure device: 
• The microcontroller is tamper resistant, making hardware and side-channel 
attacks highly difficult. 
• Software is certified according to the Common Criteria certification12 making 
software attacks highly difficult. 
• The embedded software can be auto-administered more easily than its multi-
user central server counterpart thanks to its simplicity, removing the need for 
DBAs and therefore eliminating such insider attacks. 
• Even the secure device's owner cannot directly access the data stored locally 
(she must authenticate, using a PIN code or a certificate, and only gets data 
according to her privileges);  
12 http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/   
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 The secure device's trustworthiness stems from the expected high Cost/Benefit ratio 
of an attack: secure devices enforce the highest hardware and software security 
standards (prohibitive costs), and each of them hosts the data of a single individual 
(low benefits). 
 
Figure 2: Trusted Data Servers 
No Guarantee of Availability.  
A secure device provides no guarantee of availability: it is physically controlled by its 
owner who connects and disconnects it at will. 
Modest Computing Resource.  
A secure device provides modest computing resources. Although the tamper 
resistance requirement restricts the general computing resources of the secure 
environment, it is common that dedicated hardware circuits handle cryptographic 
operations efficiently (e.g., dedicated AES and SHA hardware implementations). The 
secure environment also contains a small amount of persistent memory in charge of 
storing the code executed in the secure device and the cryptographic keys (also 
called cryptographic material). For the sake of simplicity, we assume that each 
secure device already contains its cryptographic material and privacy parameters 
before the protocol starts. Chapter 5 discusses practical ways of setting these pre-
required data structures. 
In summary, despite the diversity of existing hardware platforms, a secure device can 
be abstracted by (1) a Trusted Execution Environment and (2) a (potentially 
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 untrusted but cryptographically protected) mass storage area (see Figure 2)13. E.g., 
the former can be provided by a tamper-resistant microcontroller while the latter can 
be provided by Flash memory. The important assumption is that the TDS code is 
executed by the secure device hosting it and thus cannot be tampered, even by the 
TDS holder herself.  
3.3 Asymmetric Architecture 
Now that we have described the properties that this thesis expects from the secure 
portable secure device, and showed the different scenarios in which the TDS plays 
the role. We are now ready to introduce the asymmetric architecture and its 
components. 
3.3.1 The Role of a Supporting Server 
A natural approach to tackle the problem could consist in designing a distributed 
protocol involving only secure devices, without any central server. They would share 
their data together and jointly compute the results, e.g., in a peer-to-peer fashion. A 
secure device is however an autonomous and highly disconnected device, that 
moreover remains under the control of its owner. Guaranteeing the availability of 
both the data and the results of intermediate computation given such highly volatile 
devices would incur a prohibitively high network cost (data transfers between secure 
devices). Such an approach would fail to meet the Generality objective stated in the 
introduction. 
A central supporting server is thus needed; we call it the Supporting Server 
Infrastructure, SSI for short. It is required to manage the communications between 
TDSs, run the distributed query protocol and store the intermediate results produced 
by this protocol. Because SSI is implemented on regular server(s), e.g., in the Cloud, 
it exhibits the same low level of trustworthiness, high computing resources, and 
availability. Due to these characteristics of SSI, the objective is to allow SSI to 
participate in the computation as much as possible to benefit its computing capability, 
and therefore reduce the computation load on each secure device. On the other 
13 For illustration purpose, the secure device considered in our experiments is made of a tamper-resistant 
microcontroller connected to a Flash memory chip.  
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 hand, SSI is not allowed to see the sensitive information. We try to prevent SSI to 
obtain information as much as we can to satisfy the Security objective. All the 
information transferred to and stored at SSI must therefore be obfuscated 
appropriately.  
In order to delegate the computation to the SSI, secure devices must disclose 
sufficient data for allowing it to compute part of the result, reducing the computation 
on secure devices. Besides, each secure device must handle subsets of tuples 
rather than the complete dataset at once to make them easily parallelizable. Thus, 
the resulting execution sequence consists in the following steps. In the first step, 
each participating secure device sends to the SSI a tuple made of its owner's record 
obfuscated such that the SSI can use it for grouping the appropriate data but cannot 
access the raw record. After grouping, in the second step, SSI sends these groups to 
secure devices. Finally, secure devices perform in parallel the computation on 
subsets of the collected dataset and return the final result. This general approach 
obviously ensures that the partial disclosure necessary for enabling the participation 
of the untrusted SSI does not thwart the privacy guarantees of the system.  
In the following sections, we describe precisely the variants of this general approach, 
and formalize the performance and security of each variant. Three protocols are 
proposed and they differ in how SSI participates in the computation and which 
information stored at SSI, corresponding to the performance efficiency and privacy 
level. Intuitively, the more information exposed to SSI (and therefore the less security 
guarantee), the more active role of SSI in the computation, leading to the 
performance increase. This intuition will be formally proven in the following sections. 
3.3.2 The Asymmetric Architecture 
The architecture we consider is decentralized by nature. It is formed by a large set of 
low power TDSs embedded in secure devices. Each TDS exhibits three important 
properties as mention above. 
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Figure 3: The Asymmetric Architecture 
The computing architecture, illustrated in Figure 3, is said to be asymmetric in the 
sense that it is composed of a very large number of low power, weakly connected but 
highly secure TDSs and of a powerful, highly available but untrusted SSI. 
3.3.3 Threat model  
TDSs are the unique elements of trust in the architecture and are considered honest. 
As mentioned earlier, no trust assumption needs to be made on the TDS holder 
herself because a TDS is tamper-resistant and enforces the access control rules 
associated to its holder (just like a car driver cannot tamper the GPS tracker installed 
in her car by its insurance company or a customer cannot gain access to any secret 
data stored in her banking smartcard).  
We consider honest-but-curious (also called semi-honest) SSI (i.e., which tries to 
infer any information it can but strictly follows the protocol). Considering malicious 
SSI (i.e., which may tamper the protocol with no limit, including denial-of-service) is 
of little interest to this study. Indeed, a malicious SSI is likely to be detected with an 
irreversible political/financial damage and even the risk of a class action.  
The objective is thus to implement a querying protocol so that (1) the querier can 
gain access only to the final result of authorized queries (not to the raw data 
participating in the computation), as in a traditional database system and (2) 
intermediate results stored in SSI are obfuscated. Preventing inferential attacks by 
combining the result of a sequence of authorized queries as in statistical databases 
and PPDP work (see Chapter 2) is orthogonal to this study. 
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 3.3.4 Correct and secure computation 
Correctness:  
We compute the SQL queries on the data collected during the collection phase only 
(i.e., when the SIZE clause is satisfied). That means that the aggregation is 
computed over only the subset of the population. We cannot, of course, collect all 
the data of the population due to the time restriction and feasibility. Then the crucial 
question is how we can ensure that this subset correctly reflects the whole dataset. 
The answer depends on many elements. The first one is the accuracy of the answer 
that Queriers want. Apparently, the more accurate the answer, the bigger dataset we 
need to collect. The second element is the distribution property of the dataset. The 
third element is the confident level of the final result. These elements are formulized 
in the Cochran’s sample size formula [Cochran77]. We will delve into it in chapter 4.  
Security:  
In our context, the adversary is the SSI itself, and consequently accesses the 
intermediate data of the execution sequence stored at SSI, in addition to the 
encrypted output of the protocol.  
In order to enable the participation of the SSI in the protocol, secure devices must 
disclose some controlled amount of information to it. The information voluntarily 
disclosed depends on each protocol to preserve the privacy guarantees (further 
details will be given in the following chapters).   
Non-deterministic encryption is often supported for the sole purpose of protecting the 
data in storage and sacrifice the efficiency in execution on the encrypted data. 
Deterministic encryption, on the other hand, efficiently supports the execution but 
opens the door for frequency-based attack. So, balancing the trade-off between 
efficiency requirements in query execution and protection requirements due to 
possible inference attacks is inevitable. We investigate quantitative measures (i.e., 
Coefficient Exposure and Variance) to model inference exposure and provide some 
comparisons. These measures show how much information exposure in exchange of 
the efficient execution.  
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 3.4 Problem Statement 
The goal of this thesis is to design protocols to compute SQL query such that: (1) it is 
executed on the asymmetric architecture where security is pushed to the edge of 
applications, (2) its execution sequence is correct and secure, (3) where the SSI is 
honest-but-curious, and (4) it is scalable to datasets containing million of records.  
The objective was not to find the most efficient solution for a specific problem but 
rather to perform a first exploration of the design space. We proposed three very 
different protocols, compared them according to different axes, and investigated the 
performance/security trade-off among protocols. 
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 Chapter 4  
The Querying Protocols 
In this chapter, we first introduce the core infrastructure of our protocols, and then we 
show how to deal with simple SQL queries. After that, we propose protocols that can 
handle more complicated SQL queries, including Group By clauses. Finally, we show 
that our protocols are correct and secure by analyzing correctness using Cochran's 
model and security using the concept of coefficient exposure and variance. 
4.1 Introduction 
Our querying protocols share common basic mechanisms to make TDSs aware of 
the queries to be computed and to organize the dataflow between TDSs and queriers 
such that SSI cannot infer anything from the queries and their results. 
Query and result delivery: queries are executed in pull mode. A querier posts its 
query to SSI and TDSs download it at connection time. To this end, SSI can maintain 
personal query boxes (in reference to mailboxes) where each TDS receives queries 
directed to it (e.g., get the monthly energy consumption of consumer C) and a global 
query box for queries directed to the crowd (e.g., get the mean of energy 
consumption per month for people living in district D). Result tuples are gathered by 
SSI in a temporary storage area. A query remains active until the SIZE clause is 
evaluated to true by SSI, which then informs the querier that the result is ready. 
Dataflow obfuscation: all data (queries and tuples) exchanged between the querier 
and the TDSs, and between TDSs themselves, can be spied by SSI and must 
therefore be encrypted. However, an honest-but-curious SSI can try to conduct 
frequency-based attacks [Liu10], i.e., exploiting prior knowledge about the data 
distribution to infer the plaintext values of ciphertexts. Depending on the protocols 
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 (see later), two kinds of encryption schemes will be used to prevent frequency-based 
attacks. With non-deterministic (aka probabilistic) encryption, denoted by nDet_Enc, 
several encryptions of the same message yield different ciphertexts while 
deterministic encryption (Det_Enc for short) always produces the same ciphertext for 
a given plaintext and key [Bellare07]. Whatever the encryption scheme, symmetric 
keys must be shared among TDSs: we note k1 the symmetric key used by the 
querier and the TDSs to communicate together and k2 the key shared by TDSs to 
exchange temporary results among them. Note that these keys may change over 
time and the way they are delivered to TDSs is discussed more deeply in chapter 5. 
4.2 Select-From-Where statement  
This section presents the protocol to compute Select-From-Where queries. This 
protocol is simple yet very useful in practice, since many queries are of this form. We 
also use it to help the reader get used to our approach. We tackle the more difficult 
Group By clause in the next section. 
Let us first consider simple SQL queries of the form: 
SELECT <attribute(s)>  
FROM <Table(s)>  
[WHERE <condition(s)>]  
[SIZE <size condition(s)>] 
These queries do not have a GROUP BY or HAVING clause nor involve aggregate 
functions in the SELECT clause. Hence, the selected attributes may (or may not) 
contain identifying information about the individuals. Though basic, these queries 
answer a number of practical use-cases, e.g., a doctor querying the embedded 
healthcare folders of her patients, or an energy provider willing to offer special prices 
to people matching a specific consumption profile. To compute such queries, the 
protocol is divided in two phases (see Figure 4): 
Collection phase: (step 1) the querier posts on SSI a query Q encrypted with k1, its 
credential C signed by an authority and S the SIZE clause of the query in cleartext 
so that SSI can evaluate it; (step 2) targeted TDSs download Q when they connect; 
(step 3) each of these TDSs decrypts Q, checks C, evaluates the AC policy 
associated to the querier and computes the result of the WHERE clause on the local 
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 data; then each TDS either sends its result tuples (step 4), or a dummy tuple14 
whether the result is empty or the querier has not enough privilege to access these 
local data (step 4'), non-deterministically encrypted with k2. The collection phase 
stops when the SIZE condition has been reached. The result of the collection phase 
is actually the result of the query, possibly complemented with dummy tuples. We 
call it Covering Result. 
Filtering phase: (step 5) SSI partitions the Covering Result with the objective to let 
several TDSs manage next these partitions in parallel. The Covering Result being 
fully encrypted, SSI sees partitions as uninterpreted chunks of bytes; (step 6) 
connected TDSs download these partitions. These TDSs may be different from the 
ones involved in the collection phase; (step 7) each of these TDS decrypts the 
partition and filters out dummy tuples; (step 8) each TDS sends back the true tuples 
encrypted with key k1 to SSI, which finally concatenates all results and informs the 
querier that she can download the result (step 9). 
 
Figure 4: Select-From-Where querying protocol 
14 Even if the query is encrypted, sending dummy tuples avoids SSI to learn the query selectivity (and from that 
guess the query). It is also helpful in the case where SSI and querier are the same entity. 
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 Informally speaking, the correctness, security and efficiency properties of the 
protocol are as follows: 
Correctness. Since SSI is honest-but-curious, it will deliver to the querier all tuples 
returned by the TDSs. Dummy tuples are marked so that they can be recognized and 
removed after decryption by each TDS. Therefore the final result contains only true 
tuples. If a TDS goes offline in the middle of processing a partition, SSI resends that 
partition to another available TDS after a given timeout so that the result is complete. 
Security. Since SSI does not know key k1, it can decrypt neither the query nor the 
result tuples. TDSs use nDet_Enc for encrypting the result tuples so that SSI can 
neither launch any frequency-based attacks nor detect dummy tuples. There can be 
two additional risks. The first risk is that SSI acquires a TDS with the objective to get 
the cryptographic material. As stated in Chapter 3, TDS code cannot be tampered, 
even by its holder. Whatever the information decrypted internally, the only output that 
a TDS can deliver is a set of encrypted tuples, which does not represent any benefit 
for SSI. The second risk is if SSI colludes with the querier. For the same reason, SSI 
will only get the same information as the querier (i.e., the final result in clear text and 
no more). 
Efficiency. The efficiency of the protocol is linked to the frequency of TDSs 
connection and to the SIZE clause. Both the collection and filtering phases are run in 
parallel by all connected TDSs and no time-consuming task is performed by any of 
them. As the experiment section will clarify, each TDS manages incoming partitions 
in streaming because the internal time to decrypt the data and perform the filtering is 
significantly less than the time needed to download the data. 
While important in practice, executing Select-From-Where queries in the Trusted 
Cells context shows no intractable difficulties and the main objective of this section 
was to present the query framework in this simple context. Executing Group By 
queries is far more challenging. The next section will present different alternatives to 
tackle this problem. Rather than trying to get an optimal solution, which is context 
dependent, the objective is to explore the design space and show that different 
querying protocols may be devised to tackle a broad range of situations. 
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 4.3 Group By Queries 
The Group By clause introduces an extra phase: the computation of aggregates of 
data produced by different TDSs, which is the weak point for frequency-based 
attacks. In this section, we propose several protocols, discussing their strong and 
weak points from both efficiency and security points of view. 
4.3.1 Generic Query Evaluation Protocol 
Let us now consider general SQL queries of the form15: 
SELECT <attribute(s) and/or aggregate function(s)>  
FROM <Table(s)>  
[WHERE <condition(s)>]  
[GROUP BY <grouping attribute(s)>]  
[HAVING <grouping condition(s)>] 
[SIZE <size condition(s)>]   
These queries are more challenging to compute because they require performing 
set-oriented computations over intermediate results sent by TDSs to SSI. The point 
is that TDSs usually have limited RAM, limited computing resources and limited 
connectivity. It is therefore unrealistic to devise a protocol where a single TDS 
downloads the intermediate results of all participants, decrypts them and computes 
the aggregation alone. On the other hand, SSI cannot help much in the processing 
since (1) it is not allowed to decrypt any intermediate results and (2) it cannot gather 
encrypted data into groups based on the encrypted value of the grouping attributes, 
denoted by AG={Gi}, without gaining some knowledge about the data distribution. 
This would indeed violate our security assumption since the knowledge of AG 
distribution opens the door to frequency-based attacks by SSI: e.g. in the extreme 
case where AG contains both quasi-identifiers and sensitive values, attribute linkage 
would become obvious. Finally, the querier cannot help in the processing either since 
she is only granted access to the final result, and not to the raw data. 
To solve this problem, we suggest a generic aggregation protocol divided into three 
phases (see Figure 5): 
15 For the sake of clarity, we concentrate on the management of distributive, algebraic and holistic aggregate 
functions identified in [Locher 2009] as the most prominent and useful ones. 
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 Collection phase: similar to the basic protocol. 
Aggregation phase:(step 5) SSI partitions the result of the collection phase; (step 6) 
connected TDSs (may be different from the ones involved in the collection phase) 
download these partitions; (step 7) each of these TDS decrypts the partition, 
eliminates the dummy tuples and computes partial aggregations (i.e., aggregates 
data belonging to the same group inside each partition); (step 8) each TDS sends its 
partial aggregations encrypted with k2 back to SSI; depending on the protocol (see 
next sections), the aggregation phase is iterative, and continues until all tuples 
belonging to the same group have been aggregated (steps 6', 7', 8'); The last 
iteration produces a Covering Result containing a single (encrypted) aggregated 
tuple for each group. 
 
Figure 5: Group By querying protocol 
Filtering phase: this phase is similar to the basic protocol except that the role of 
step 11 is to eliminate the groups which do not satisfy the HAVING clause instead of 
eliminating dummy tuples. 
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 The rest of this section presents different variations of this generic protocol, 
depending on which encryption scheme is used in the collection and aggregation 
phases, how SSI constructs the partitions, and what information is revealed to SSI. 
Each solution has its own strengths and weaknesses and therefore is suitable for a 
specific situation. Three kinds of solutions are proposed: secure aggregation, noise-
based, and histogram-based. They are subsequently compared in terms of privacy 
protection (Section 4.5) and performance (Chapter 6). 
4.3.2 Secure Aggregation protocol 
This protocol, denoted by S_Agg and detailed in Algorithm 1, instantiates the generic 
protocol as follows. In the collection phase, each participating TDS encrypts its 
result tuples using nDet_Enc (i.e., nEk2(tup)) to prevent any frequency-based attack 
by SSI. The consequence is that SSI cannot get any knowledge about the group 
each tuple belongs to. Thus, during step 5, tuples from the same group are randomly 
distributed among the partitions. This imposes the aggregation phase to be iterative, 
as illustrated in Figure 6. At each iteration, TDSs download encrypted partitions (i.e., 
Ωe) containing a sequence of (AG, Aggregate) value pairs ((City, 
Energy_consumption) in the example), decrypt them to plaintext partitions (i.e., Ω ← 
nEk2-1(Ωe)), aggregate values belonging to the same grouping attributes (i.e., Ωnew = 
Ωold⊕ Ω), and sends back to SSI a smaller encrypted sequence of (AG, Aggregate) 
value pairs where values of the same group have been aggregated. SSI gathers 
these partial aggregations to form new partitions, and so on and so forth until a 
single partition (i.e., Ωfinal) is produced, which contains the final aggregation. 
Correctness. The requirement for S_Agg to terminate is that TDSs have enough 
resources to perform partial aggregations. Each TDS needs to maintain in memory a 
data structure called partial aggregate which stores the current value of the 
aggregate function being computed for each group. Each tuple read from the input 
partition contributes to the current value of the aggregate function for the group this 
tuple belongs to. Hence the partial aggregate structure must fit in RAM (or be 
swapped in stable storage at much higher cost). If the number of groups is high (e.g., 
grouping on a key attribute) and TDSs have a tiny RAM, this may become a limiting 
factor. 
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Figure 6: An example of (iterative partial) aggregation 
Security. In all phases, the information revealed to SSI is a sequence of tuples or 
value pairs (i.e., tupe and Ωe) encrypted non-deterministically (nDet_Enc) so that SSI 
cannot conduct any frequency-based attack. 
Efficiency. The aggregation process is such that the parallelism between TDSs 
decreases at each iteration (i.e., , with  being the number of 
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 TDSs that participate in the ith partial aggregation phase), up to having a single TDS 
producing the final aggregation (i.e.,  = 1). The cost model is proposed in 
Chapter 6 to find the optimal value for the reduction factor . Note again that 
incoming partitions are managed in streaming because the cost to download the data 
significantly dominates the rest. 
Suitable queries. Because of the limited RAM size, this algorithm is applicable for 
the queries with small G such as Q1: SELECT AVG(Salary) FROM Paris_Population 
WHERE Age>20 GROUP BY Zipcode (Paris has 20 different zip codes corresponding to 
20 districts) or Q2: SELECT COUNT(*) FROM Paris_Population WHERE Age>20 GROUP 
BY Gender. 
4.3.3 Noise-based protocols 
In these protocols, called Noise_based and detailed in Algorithm 2, Det_Enc is used 
during the collection phase on the grouping attributes AG. This is a significant 
change, since it allows SSI to help in data processing by assembling tuples 
belonging to the same groups in the same partitions. However, the downside is that 
using Det_Enc reveals the distribution of AG to SSI. To prevent this disclosure, the 
fundamental idea is that TDSs add some noise (i.e., fake tuples) to the data in order 
to hide the real distribution. The added fake tuples must have identified 
characteristics, as dummy tuples, such that TDSs can filter them out in a later step. 
The aggregation phase is roughly similar to S_Agg, except that the content of 
partitions is no longer random, thereby accelerating convergence and allowing 
parallelism up to the final iteration. Two solutions are introduced to generate noise: 
random (white) noise, and noise controlled by complementary domains. 
Random (white) noise solutions. In this solution, denoted Rnf_Noise, nf fake tuples 
are generated randomly then added. TDSs apply Det-Enc on AG, and nDet_Enc on 
ĀG (the attributes not appearing in the GROUP BY clause). However, because the 
fake tuples are randomly generated, the distribution of mixed values may not be 
different enough from that of true values especially if the disparity in frequency 
among AG is big. To overcome this difficulty, a large quantity of fake tuples (nf>>1) 
must be injected to make the fake distribution dominate the true one. 
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Noise controlled by complementary domains. This solution, called C_Noise, 
overcomes the limitation of Rnf_Noise by generating fake tuples based on the prior 
knowledge of the AG domain cardinality. Let us assume that AG domain cardinality is 
nd(e.g., for attribute Age, nd ≈ 130), a TDS will generate nd - 1 fake tuples, one for 
each value different from the true one. The resulting distribution is totally flat by 
construction. However, if the domain cardinality is not readily available, a cardinality 
discovering algorithm must be launched beforehand (see next section). 
Correctness. True tuples are grouped in partitions according to the value of their AG 
attributes so that the aggregate function can be computed correctly. Fake tuples are 
eliminated during the aggregation phase by TDSs thanks to their identified 
characteristics and do not contribute to the computation. 
Security. Although TDSs apply Det-Enc on AG, AG distribution remains hidden to 
SSI by injecting enough white noise such that the fake distribution dominates the 
true one or by adding controlled noise producing a flat distribution. 
Efficiency. TDSs do not need to materialize a large partial aggregate structure as in 
S_Agg because each partition contains tuples belonging to a small set of (ideally one) 
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 groups. Additionally, this property guarantees the convergence of the aggregation 
process and increases the parallelism in all phases of the protocol. However, the 
price to pay is the production and the elimination afterwards of a potentially very high 
number of fake tuples (the value is algorithm and data dependent). 
Suitable queries. Rnf_Noise with small nf is suitable for the queries in which there is 
no wide disparity in frequency between AG such as Q3: SELECT COUNT(Child) FROM 
Paris_Population GROUP BY Father’s_Name HAVING COUNT(Child) < 4. In contrast, 
the white noise solution with big nf is suitable for queries with big disparity such as 
Q4: SELECT COUNT(*) FROM Paris_Population GROUP BY Salary because the 
number of very rich people (i.e, salary > 1 M€/year) is much less than that of people 
having average salary. For the C_Noise, in term of the feasibility, because the 
process of calculating aggregation is divided among connected TDSs in a distributed 
and parallel way, better balancing the loads between TDSs, this protocol is 
applicable not only for the queries where G is small (e.g., Q1, Q2) but also for those 
with big G, such as Q5: SELECT AVG(Salary) FROM Paris_Population WHERE Age>20 
GROUP BY Age (because the Age’s domain is 130 at maximum). However, considering 
the efficiency, because the number of fake tuples is proportional to G, this solution is 
inappropriate for the queries with very big G (e.g., Q4) when it has to generate and 
process a large amount number of fake tuples. 
4.3.4 Equi-depth histogram-based protocol 
Getting a prior knowledge of the domain extension of AG allows significant 
optimizations as illustrated by C_Noise. Let us go one step further and exploit the 
prior knowledge of the real distribution of AG attributes. The idea is no longer to 
generate noisy data but rather to produce a uniform distribution of true data sent to 
SSI by grouping them into equi-depth histograms, in a way similar to [Hacigumus02]. 
The protocol, named ED_Hist, works as follows. Before entering the protocol, the 
distribution of AG attributes must be discovered and distributed to all TDSs. This 
process needs to be done only once and refreshed from time to time instead of being 
run for each query. The discovery process is similar to computing a Count function 
on Group By AG and can therefore be performed using one of the protocol 
introduced above. During the collection phase, each TDS uses this knowledge to 
calculate nearly equi-depth histograms that is a decomposition of the AG domain into 
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 buckets holding nearly the same number of true tuples. Each bucket is identified by a 
hash value giving no information about the position of the bucket elements in the 
domain. Then the TDS allocates its tuple(s) to the corresponding bucket(s) and 
sends to SSI couples of the form (h(bucketId), nDet_Enc(tuple)). During the 
partitioning step of the aggregation phase, SSI assembles tuples belonging to the 
same buckets in the same partitions. Each partition may contain several groups 
since a same bucket holds several distinct values. The first aggregation step 
computes partial aggregations of these partitions and returns to SSI results of the 
form (Det_Enc(group), nDet_Enc(partial aggregate)). A second aggregation step is 
required to combine these partial aggregations and deliver the final aggregation. 
Correctness. Only true tuples are delivered by TDSs and they are grouped in 
partitions according to the bucket they belong to. Buckets are disjoint and partitions 
contain a small set of grouping values so that partial aggregations can be easily 
computed by TDSs. 
Security. SSI only sees a nearly uniform distribution of h(bucketId) values and 
cannot infer any information about the true distribution of AG attributes. Note that 
h(bucketId) plays here the same role as Det_Enc(bucketId) values but is cheaper to 
compute for TDSs. 
Efficiency. TDSs do not need to materialize a large partial aggregate structure as in 
S_Agg because each partition contains tuples belonging to a small set of groups 
during the first phase and to a single group during the second phase. As for C_Noise, 
this property guarantees convergence of the aggregation process and maximizes the 
parallelism in all phases of the protocol. But contrary to C_Noise, this benefit does 
not come at the price of managing fake tuples. 
Suitable queries. This solution is suitable for both kinds of queries (i.e., with small G 
like Q1, Q2 and big G like Q4, Q5) both in terms of efficiency (because it does not 
handle fake data) and feasibility (because it divides the big group into smaller ones 
and assigns the tasks for TDSs). 
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This section shows that the design space for executing complex queries with Group 
By is large. It presented three different alternatives for computing these queries and 
provided a short initial discussion about their respective correctness, security and 
efficiency. Chapter 6 compares in a deeper way these alternatives in terms of 
performance while section 4.5 analyzes the comparison of these same alternatives 
in terms of security. The objective is to assess whether one solution dominates the 
others in all situations or which parameters are the most influential in the selection of 
the solution best adapted to each context. 
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 4.4 Correctness 
In scenarios where TDSs are seldom connected (e.g., TDSs hosting a PCEHR), the 
collection phase of the querying protocol may be critical since its duration depends 
on the connection rate of TDSs. However, many of these scenarios can 
accommodate a result computed on a representative subset of the queried dataset 
(e.g., if Querier wants to find out the average salary of people in France with the total 
population of 65 millions, it is reasonable to survey only a fraction of the population). 
The question thus becomes how to calibrate the dataset subset? Larger subsets 
slow down the collection phase while smaller subsets diminish the accuracy and/or 
utility of the results. To determine if a sample population accurately portrays the 
actual population, we can estimate the sample size required to determine the actual 
mean within a given error threshold [Cochran77]. 
We propose to use the Cochran’s sample size formula [Cochran77] to calculate the 
required sample size as follow: 
 
with popm the size of the actual population, λ the user selected error rate, z the user 
selected confidence level, and σ the standard deviation of the actual population. The 
meaning of each parameter in this formula is explained below. 
The error rate λ (sometimes called the level of precision) is the range in which the 
true value of the population is estimated to be (e.g., if a report states that 60% of 
people in the sample living in Paris have salary greater than 1300 EUR/month with 
an error rate of ±5%, then we can conclude that between 55% and 65% of Parisian 
earn more than 1300 EUR/month). 
The confidence level z is originated from the ideas of the Central Limit Theorem 
which states that when a population is repeatedly sampled, the average value of the 
attribute obtained by those samples approaches to the true population value. 
Moreover, the values obtained by these samples are distributed normally around the 
real value (i.e., some samples having a higher value and some obtaining a lower 
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 score than the true population value). In a normal distribution, approximately 95% of 
the sample values are within two standard deviations of the true population value 
(e.g., mean). 
The degree of variability σ of the dataset refers to the distribution of attributes in the 
population. A low standard deviation indicates that the data points tend to be very 
close to the expected value; a high standard deviation indicates that the data points 
are spread out over a large range of values. The more heterogeneous a population, 
the larger the sample size required to obtain a given level of precision and vice versa. 
To take into account the fact that some TDS’s holders may opt out of the query, let us 
call optout the percentage of TDSs that opt out of the survey. Then, the required 
sample size we need to collect in the collection phase is: 
 
Among the three parameters, λ and z are user selected but σ is data-dependent. 
Cochran [Cochran77] listed four ways of estimating population variances for sample 
size determinations: (1) take the sample in two steps, and use the results of the first 
step to determine how many additional responses are needed to attain an 
appropriate sample size based on the variance observed in the first step data; (2) 
use pilot study results; (3) use data from previous studies of the same or a similar 
population; or (4) estimate or guess the structure of the population assisted by some 
logical mathematical results. Usually, z = 1.96 (i.e., within two standard deviations of 
the mean of the actual population) is often chosen in statistics to reflect 95% 
confidence level. In the experiment, because σ is data-dependent, we will vary this 
parameter to see its impact to S. We also vary the error rate reflecting Querier’s 
preference. 
4.5 Security Analysis  
To analyze the security of our proposed protocols, we use two techniques to 
evaluate based on the assumption of the adversary’s knowledge. In the first way, 
with the assumption that the attacker knows the distribution of the cleartext dataset, 
we use the coefficient exposure to measure how much information revealed in each 
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 protocols. Then, in the second way with stronger assumption that the attacker knows 
exact probability distribution of the values within each bucket, variance is used to 
analyze the security.   
4.5.1 Coefficient Exposure 
In this section, in order to quantify the confidentiality of each algorithm, we measure 
the information exposure of the encrypted data they reveal to SSI by using the 
approach proposed in [Damiani03] which introduces the concept of coefficient to 
assess the exposure. To illustrate, let us consider the example in Figure 7 where 
Figure 7a is taken from [Damiani03] and Figure 7b is the extension of [Damiani03] 
applied in our context. The plaintext table Accounts is encrypted in different ways 
corresponding to our proposed protocols. To measure the exposure, we consider the 
probability that an attacker can reconstruct the plaintext table (or part of the table) by 
using the encrypted table and his prior knowledge about global distributions of 
plaintext attributes. 
 
Figure 7: Encryptions and IC tables 
Although the attacker does not know which encrypted column corresponds to which 
plaintext attribute, he can determine the actual correspondence by comparing their 
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 cardinalities. Namely, she can determine that IA, IC, and IB correspond to attributes 
Account, Customer, and Balance respectively. Then, the IC table (the table of the 
inverse of the cardinalities of the equivalence classes) is formed by calculating the 
probability that an encrypted value can be correctly matched to a plaintext value. For 
example, with Det_Enc, P(α = Alice) = 1 and P(κ = 200) = 1 since the attacker knows 
that the plaintexts Alice and 200 have the most frequent occurrences in the Accounts 
table (or in the global distribution) and observes that the ciphertexts α and κ have 
highest frequencies in the encrypted table respectively. The attacker can infer with 
certainty that not only α and κ represent values Alice and 200 (encryption inference) 
but also that the plaintext table contains a tuple associating values Alice and 200 
(association inference). The probability of disclosing a specific association (e.g., 
<Alice,200>) is the product of the inverses of the cardinalities (e.g., P(<α,κ> = 
<Alice,200>) = P(α = Alice)× P(κ = 200) = 1). The exposure coefficient Ԑ of the whole 
table is estimated as the average exposure of each tuple in it. 
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Here, n is the number of tuples, k is the number of attributes, and ICi,j is the value in 
row i and column j in the IC table. Let’s Nj be the number of distinct plaintext values 
in the global distribution of attribute in column j (i.e., Nj ≤ n). 
Using nDet_Enc, because the distribution of ciphertexts is obfuscated uniformly, the 
probability of guessing the true plaintext of α is P(α = Alice) = 1/5. So, ICi,j = 1/Nj for 
all i, j, and thus the exposure coefficient of S_Agg is: 
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For the nearly equi-depth histogram, each hash value can correspond to multiple 
plaintext values. Therefore, each hash value in the equivalence class of multiplicity 
m can represent any m values extracted from the plaintext set, that is, there are 
jN
m
 
 
  
different possibilities. The identification of the correspondence between hash and 
plaintext values requires finding all possible partitions of the plaintext values such 
that the sum of their occurrences is the cardinality of the hash value, equating to 
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 solving the NP-Hard multiple subset sum problem [Ceselli05]. We consider two 
critical values of collision factor h (defined as the ratio G/M between the number of 
groups G and the number M of distinct hash values) that correspond to two extreme 
cases (i.e., the least and most exposure) of ɛED_Hist: (1) h = G: all plaintext values 
collide on the same hash value and (2) h = 1: distinct plaintext values are mapped to 
distinct hash values (i.e., in this case, the nearly equi-depth histogram becomes 
Det_Enc since the same plaintext values will be mapped to the same hash value). 
In the first case, the optimal coefficient exposure of histogram is: 
_
1
min( ) 1/
k
ED Hist j
j
Nε
=
= ∏
 
because ICi,j = 1/Nj for all i, j. For the second case, the experiment in [Ceselli05] 
(where they generated a number of random databases whose number of 
occurrences of each plaintext value followed a Zipf distribution) varies the value of h 
to see its impact to ɛED_Hist. This experiment shows that the smaller the value of h, 
the bigger the ɛED_Hist and ɛED_Hist reaches maximum value (i.e., max(ɛED_Hist) ≈ 0.4) 
when h = 1.  
For Noise_based algorithms, when nf = 0 (i.e., no fake tuples), Rnf_Noise becomes 
Det_Enc and therefore it has maximum exposure in this case. If nf is not big enough, 
since each TDS generates very few fake tuples, the transformed distribution cannot 
hide some ciphertexts with remarkable (highest or lowest) frequencies, increasing 
the exposure. The bigger the nf, the lower the probability that these ciphertexts are 
revealed. Exceptionally, when the noise is not random (but controlled by domain 
cardinality of AG), C_Noise has better exposure since all ciphertexts have the same 
frequency (ICi,j = 1/Nj for all i, j): 
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 The exposure coefficient gets the highest value when no encryption is used at all and 
therefore all plaintexts are displayed to attacker. In this case, ICi,j = 1 ∀ i, j, and thus 
the exposure coefficient of plaintext table is (trivially) 
_
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The information exposures among our proposed solutions are summarized in Figure 
8. In conclusion, S_Agg is the most secure protocol. To reach the highest secure 
level as the S_Agg, other protocols must pay some high prices. Specifically, 
Rnf_Noise has to generate a very large amount of noise regardless of the value of G; 
C_Noise also incurs large noise if G is big; and ED_Hist must have a significant 
collision factor. 
 
Figure 8: Information exposure among protocols  
. 
4.5.2 Variance 
In this section, we propose a stronger assumption that the adversary (A for short) 
possesses more knowledge of encrypted dataset than the previous section: A knows 
the entire bucketization scheme and the exact probability distribution of the values 
within each bucket. For example, given that bucket B has 10 elements, we assume A 
knows that: 3 of them have value 85, 3 have value 87 and 4 have value 95, say. 
However, since the elements within each bucket are indistinguishable, this does not 
allow A to map values to elements with absolute certainty. Then, the A’s goal is to 
determine the precise values of sensitive attributes of some (all) individuals (records) 
with high degree of confidence. Eg: What is the value of salary field for a specific 
tuple? [Hore04] proposes the Variance of the distribution of values within a bucket B 
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 as its measure of privacy guarantee. They first define the term Average Squared 
Error of Estimation (ASEE) as follows. 
Definition ASEE: Assume a random variable XB follows the same distribution as the 
elements of bucket B and let PB denote its probability distribution. For the case of a 
discrete (continuous) random variable, we can derive the corresponding probability 
mass (density) function denoted by pB. Then, the goal of the adversary is to estimate 
the true value of a random element chosen from this bucket. We assume that A 
employs a statistical estimator for this purpose which is, itself a random variable, X’B 
with probability distribution P’B.  
In other words, A guesses that the value of X’B is xi, with probability p’B(xi). If there 
are N values in the domain of B, then we define Average Squared Error of 
Estimation (ASEE) as: 
 
Theorem [Hore04]: ASEE(X, X’) = Var(X) + Var(X’) + (E(X) - E(X’))2 where X and X’ 
are random variables with probability mass (density) functions p and p0, respectively. 
Also Var(X) and E(X) denote variance and expectation of X respectively. 
Proof: interested readers refer to [Hore04] for a detail proof of this theorem. 
Note that unlike coefficient exposure, the smaller value of ASEE implies the bigger 
security breach because the distance between guessed values and actual values is 
smaller, and vice versa. So the adversary tries to minimize ASEE as much as he can. 
From the theorem above, it is easy to see that A can minimize ASEE(XB, X’B) in two 
ways: 1) by reducing Var(X’B) or 2) by reducing the absolute value of the difference 
E(XB) - E(X’B). Therefore, the best estimator of the value of an element from bucket 
B that A can get, is the constant estimator equal to the mean of the distribution of the 
elements in B (i.e., E(XB)). For the constant estimator X’B, Var(X’B) = 0. Also, as 
follows from basic sampling theory, the “mean value of the sample-means is a good 
estimator of the population (true) mean”. Thus, A can minimize the last term in the 
above expression by drawing increasing number of samples or, equivalently, 
obtaining a large sample of plaintext values from B. However, note that the one 
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 factor that A cannot control (irrespective of the estimator he uses) is the true variance 
of the bucket values, Var(XB). Therefore, even in the worst case scenario (i.e., E(X’B) 
= E(XB) and Var(X’B) = 0), A still cannot reduce the ASEE below Var(XB), which, 
therefore, forms the lowest bound of the accuracy achievable by A. Hence, the data 
owners try to bucketize data in order to maximize the variance of the distribution of 
values within each bucket. These two cases corresponds to the two extreme cases 
of nearly equi-depth histogram (when h = 1 and h = G) as analyzed below. 
When h = 1 (Det_Enc), since each bucket contains only the same plaintext values, 
and with the assumption above about additional knowledge of adversary, he can 
easily infer that the expected value of X’B equals to that of XB: E(X’B) = E(XB). For 
the variance, with h = 1, the variance of X’B gets the minimum value Var(X’B) = 0 
(because variance measures how far a set of numbers is spread out, a variance of 
zero indicates that all the values are identical). In this case, the value of ASEE 
equals to the lowest bound Var(XB). 
When h = G, since all plaintext values collide on the same hash value, the difference 
between E(X’2B) – (E(X’B))2 is big, leading to the big value of Var(X’B). So, the value 
of ASEE approaches highest bound. 
As you can see, although the coefficient exposure and average squared error of 
estimation are different ways to measure privacy of equi-depth histogram depending 
on the adversary’s knowledge, they give the same result. 
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 Chapter 5  
Implementation 
In this chapter, we describe how to turn the theoretical TDS concept into a real 
computing infrastructure and how to solve related issues such as access control, 
fault tolerance, load balance in order to make the protocols feasible. We also 
propose the adaptive key exchange protocol, the important protocol that ensures the 
safety in sharing the keys among participants. Finally, we detail the prototype 
platform which is an instance of the architecture presented in previous chapter. 
5.1 Implementation Issues 
5.1.1 Making the TDS Concept Concrete 
This work was partially supported by ANR grant KISS n° ANR-11-INSE-0005 with the 
objective to add distributed query facilities to the Personal Data Server named 
PlugDB16. PlugDB is a database engine embedded in a secure device combining the 
tamper-resistance of a smartcard and the storage capacity of a µSD card (see a 
picture of the hardware platform in Figure 14). The PlugDB embedded database 
engine is responsible for organizing all personal data in a relational database style, 
indexing the data, executing queries on it and protecting it through access control 
rules and encryption of the data at rest. The Yvelines district in France is currently 
running a large scale field experiment using PlugDB to implement a secure and 
portable medical-social folder improving the coordination of medical and social care 
at home for elderly patients. 
16 https://project.inria.fr/plugdb/ 
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Figure 9: KISS Personal Data Server Architecture 
As pictured in Figure 9, the KISS consortium extends PlugDB towards the support (1) 
of a wider form of personal data (spatio-temporal data, sensed data streams, 
documents, links to remote - encrypted - files), (2) of usage control rules, notably by 
integrating data provenance in the definition of the policies) and (3) of distributed 
facilities to execute global queries and produce anonymized releases. We refer the 
reader interested in a deeper description of the KISS project to [KISS12] and 
concentrate the next subsections to specific aspects of the KISS architecture linked 
to the management of distributed queries, namely how to enforce access control 
during query execution, how to organize the collection phase and how to organize 
the computation to guarantee fault tolerance and load balancing. This extension of 
PlugDB to distributed queries has been demonstrated in [To14b]. 
5.1.2 Enforcing Access Control 
Contrary to statistical databases or PPDP works where the protection resides on the 
fact that aggregate queries or anonymized releases do not reveal any information 
linkable to individuals, we consider here traditional SQL queries and a traditional 
access control model where subjects (either users, roles or applications) are granted 
access to objects (either tables or views). In the fully decentralized context we are 
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 targeting, this impacts both the definition of the access control (AC for short) and its 
enforcement. 
AC policies can be defined and signed by trusted authorities (e.g., Ministry of Health, 
bank consortium, consumer association). As for the cryptographic material, such 
predefined policy can be either installed at burn time or be downloaded dynamically 
by each TDS using the key exchange protocols discussed in section 5.2. In more 
flexible scenarios, users may be allowed to modify the predefined AC policy to 
personalize it or to define it from scratch. The latter case results in a decentralized 
Hippocratic database [Agrawal02] in the sense that tuples belonging to a same table 
vertically partitioned among individuals may be ruled by different AC policies. Lastly, 
each individual may have the opportunity to opt-in/out of a given query. Our query 
execution protocol accommodates this diversity by construction, each TDS checking 
the querier's credentials and evaluating the AC policy locally before delivering any 
result (either true or dummy tuples depending on the AC outcome). 
 
Figure 10: Functional architecture of a trusted AC system [Anciaux09] 
But how can AC be safely enforced at TDS side? The querier's credentials are 
themselves certified by a trusted party (e.g., a public organization or a company 
consortium delivering certificates to professionals to testify their identity and roles). 
As shown in Figure 10, TDSs checks the querier's credentials and evaluates the AC 
policies thanks to an AC engine embedded on the secure chip, thereby protecting 
the control against any form of tampering. Details about the implementation of such a 
tamper-resistant AC module can be found in [Anciaux09]. 
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 5.1.3 Organizing the computation 
Fault tolerance. In scenarios where TDSs disconnect at will, or in case of local 
failure, some tasks may be interrupted in the middle of their processing. To prevent 
data loss, SSI handles failures by re-executing the failed job on some other TDSs. 
SSI periodically pings the TDSs that received data in the previous steps. If SSI 
receives no response from a TDS after the timeout period has expired, that TDS is 
marked as faulty and its job is simply reassigned to another TDS. If the presumed 
faulty TDS finally sends its result to SSI, this result is ignored.  
Load balancing. The trivial protocol in which SSI would send all collected data to a 
single TDS to compute the final result is meaningless in our setting because: (1) the 
modest storage and computing resource of a TDS would not allow it to handle such 
big data, (2) even if a TDS could handle that data in streaming, the computing time 
would not be compatible with a normal use of TDSs, considering that the primary 
objective of a TDS is usually not to participate in distributed queries (e.g., a patient 
plugging his TDS to update his medical record will not wait for hours in the 
physician's office until a distributed query is completed), (3) this TDS will become a 
single point of attack as in the centralized model17. 
Because of this, SSI mobilizes all connected TDSs to participate in a parallel 
computation of a query. The total load is distributed to available TDSs in such a way 
that the global execution time is minimal. In each step of the protocol, the load of the 
next step is smaller than that of the previous step, and therefore the number of 
mobilized TDSs reduces in each step (we call it the reduction factor). In the 
experiment section below, we use a cost model to find out the optimal reduction 
factor so that the execution time is smallest. The cost model also calculates the load 
each TDS has to incur in average. 
17 In this thesis, we make the theoretical assumption that TDSs are unbreakable. The assumption that a TDS will 
actually not be broken makes sense in practice thanks to the very high value of the ratio cost/benefit of an attack. 
However, by concentrating the computation on a single TDS, this ratio significantly decreases because a 
successful attack (still highly difficult to conduct) will reveal all the data. 
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 5.2 Key Management 
Our protocols rely heavily on the use of symmetric key cryptography. This section 
explains how these keys (k1 for Querier-TDS communication and k2 for inter-TDS 
communication) can be managed and shared in a secure way.  
5.2.1 State-of-the-Art on Group Key Management 
Group key management protocols can be roughly classified into three classes: 
centralized, decentralized, and distributed [Rafaeli03]. In centralized group key 
protocols, a single entity is employed to control the whole group and is responsible 
for distributing group keys to group members. In the decentralized approaches, a set 
of group managers is responsible for managing the group as opposed to a single 
entity. In the distributed method, group members themselves contribute to the 
formation of group keys and are equally responsible for the re-keying and distribution 
of group keys. Their analysis [Rafaeli03] made clear that there is no unique solution 
that can satisfy all requirements. While centralized key management schemes are 
easy to implement, they tend to impose an overhead on a single entity. 
Decentralized protocols are relatively harder to implement and raise other issues, 
such as interfering with the data path or imposing security hazards on the group. 
Moreover, distributed key management, by design, is simply not scalable. Hence it is 
important to understand fully the requirements of the application to select the most 
suitable GKE protocol. Under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, some 
works [Wu11, Bresson04] proposed group key exchange protocol suitable for low-
power devices. These works achieve communication efficiency because they require 
only two communication rounds to establish the shared key. They also require little 
computing resources of participants and are thus suitable for the TDS context.  
5.2.2 Overview of Key Management 
There are numerous ways to share the keys between TDSs and Querier depending 
on which context we consider.  
In the closed context, we assume that all TDSs are produced by the same provider, 
so the shared key k2 can be installed into TDSs at manufacturing time. If Querier 
also owns a TDS, key k1 can be installed at manufacturing time as well. Otherwise, 
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 Querier must create a private/public key and can use another way (PKI or GKE 
described below) to exchange key k1. An illustrative scenario for the closed context 
can be: patients and physicians in a hospital get each a TDS from the hospital, all 
TDSs being produced by the same manufacturer, so that the required cryptographic 
material is preinstalled in all TDSs before queries are executed.   
In an open context, a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) can be used so that queriers 
and TDSs all have a public-private key pair. When a TDS or querier registers for an 
application, it gets the required symmetric keys encrypted with its own public key. 
Since the total number of TDS manufacturers is assumed to be very small (in 
comparison with the total number of TDSs) and all the TDSs produced by the same 
producer have the same private/public key pair, the total number of private/public key 
pairs in the whole system is not big. Therefore, deploying a PKI in our architecture is 
suitable since it does not require an enormous investment in managing a very large 
number of private/public key pairs (i.e., proportional to the number of TDSs). PKI can 
be used to exchange both keys k1 and k2 for both Querier cases i.e. owning a 
secure device or not. In the case we want to exchange k2, we can apply the above 
protocol for k1 with Querier being replaced by one of the TDSs. This TDS can be 
chosen randomly or based on its connection time (e.g., the TDS that has the longest 
connection time to SSI will be chosen).  
An illustrative scenario for the open context can be: TDSs are integrated in smart 
phones produced by different smart phone producers. Each producer has many 
models (e.g., iPhone 1-6 of Apple, Galaxy S1-S5 of Samsung, Xperia Z1-Z4 of 
Sony…) and we assume that it installs the same private/public key on each model. In 
total, there are about one hundred models in the current market, so the number of 
different private/public keys is manageable. The phone’s owner can then securely 
take part in surveys such as: what is the volume of 4G data people living in Paris 
consume in one month, group by network operators (Orange, SFR…). 
Another way to deliver the shared key to TDSs and Querier in the open context is to 
use the Group Key Exchange protocol (GKE for short) [Wu11, Amir04, Wu08] so that 
Querier can securely exchange the secret key to all TDSs. Some GKE protocols 
[Amir04] require a broadcast operation in which a participant sends part of the key to 
the rest. These protocols are not suitable for our architecture since TDSs 
communicate together indirectly through SSI. This incurs a lot of operations for SSI 
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 to broadcast the messages (i.e., O(n2), with n is the number of participants). Other 
protocols [Wu08] overcome this weakness by requiring that participants form a tree 
structure to reduce the communication cost. Unfortunately, SSI has no knowledge in 
advance about TDSs thus this tree cannot be built. The work in [Wu11] proposes a 
protocol with two rounds of communications and only one broadcast operation. 
However, this protocol still has the inherent weakness of the GKE: all participants 
must connect during the key exchange phase. This characteristic does not fit in our 
architecture since TDSs are weakly connected. Finally, the Broadcast Encryption 
Scheme (BES) [Castelluccia05] requires that all participants have a shared secret in 
advance, preventing us from using it in a context where TDSs are produced by 
different manufacturers. 
In consequence, we must propose an adaptive GKE scheme, fitting our architecture 
in the following section. 
5.2.3 The Adaptive Key Exchange Protocol 
Let p, q be two large primes satisfying p = 2q + 1; Gq be a subgroup of Zp* with the 
order q; g be a generator of the group Gq; H1, H2 be two one-way hash functions 
such that H1, H2: {0, 1}* -> Zq*; SID be a public session identity (note that each 
session is assigned a unique SID). Without loss of generality, let {Q, U1, U2,…, Un} 
be a set of participants who want to generate a group secret key, where Q is the 
Querier and U1, U2,…, Un are TDSs. This dynamic GKE protocol is depicted in 
Figure 11 and the detailed steps are described as follows. 
Step 1: Each client Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n) computes r i = H1(Kpi) and zi = gri mod p with Kpi is 
the private key of each TDS. Then, each Ui sends (Ui, zi) to SSI. Since all TDSs 
produced by the same producer share the same private/public key pair, they 
generate the same zi. When this collection phase stops, SSI forwards all these (Ui, 
zi) to Querier Q. 
Step 2: Querier Q first selects two random values r0, r ∈Zq* and computes z0 = gr0 
mod p. Upon receiving n pairs (Ui, zi) (1 ≤ i ≤ n), Querier eliminates the duplicated zi, 
(we assume that there remains only m pairs (Ui,zi) with distinct zi). Since the number 
of producers is very small in comparison with the number of TDSs, we have m << n. 
Q computes xi = zir0 mod p and yi = H2(xi|| SID) ⊕ r for i=1, 2,…, m. Finally, Q 
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 computes the shared session key SK = H2(r||y1||y2||…||ym||SID) and broadcasts (Q, 
y1, y2…, ym, z0, SID) to all TDSs. Since m << n, the length of the broadcast 
message (U0,y1,y2…,ym,z0, SID) is very short, saving network bandwidth. 
Step 3: Upon receiving the messages (Q, y1, y2…, ym, z0, SID), each TDS can 
compute y’i = H2(xi || SID’)⊕ r’ and uses r to obtain the shared key SK = 
H2(r||y1||y2||…||ym||SID). In this step, even if some TDS did not participate in the first 
step of the protocol, they still can get the secret group key SK because they can use 
their private key and the public hash function H1 to compute the value ri that all the 
TDSs belonging to the same manufacturer can compute.  
 
Figure 11: Adaptive Key Exchange Protocol 
Note that for the security of the proposed protocol, given the Diffie-Hellman problem 
(see below), we make the following classical DDH and CDH assumptions, and 
assume there exists a secure one-way hash function. 
Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem: Given ya = gx1 mod p and yb = gx2 mod p 
for some x1, x2 ∈ Z*q, the DDH problem is to distinguish two tuples (ya, yb, gx1x2 mod 
p) and (ya, yb, R ∈ Gq). 
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 DDH assumption: There exists no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm can solve 
the DDH problem with a non-negligible advantage. 
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem: Given a tuple (g, gx1 mod p, gx2 
mod p) for some x1, x2 ∈ Z*q, the CDH problem is to compute the value gx1x2 mod p 
∈ Gq. 
CDH assumption: There exists no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm can solve 
the CDH problem with a non-negligible advantage. 
Hash function assumption: A secure one-way hash function H: X={0,1}* -> Y=Z*q 
must satisfy following requirements: 
(i) for any y ∈ Y, it is hard to find x ∈ X such that H(x)=y. 
(ii) for any x ∈ X, it is hard to find x’ ∈ X such that x’ ≠ x and H(x’) = H(x). 
(iii) it is hard to find x, x’ ∈ X such that x’ ≠ x and H(x)=H(x’).  
5.2.4 The Efficiency of the Adaptive Key Exchange Protocol 
This method has two advantages in terms of asynchronous connection and 
performance over other GKEs in literature. First, this adaptive protocol perfectly fits 
our weakly connected assumption regarding the participating TDSs. Specifically, this 
protocol does not require that all TDSs connect at the same time to form the group, 
the connection of a single TDS per manufacturer being enough. The encrypted k2 
could be stored temporarily on SSI so that the offline TDS can get it as soon as it 
comes online and still take part in the protocol (i.e., any TDS that connects later can 
use its private key to compute the ri, then SK, and after that can participate into the 
computation). Second, even if a TDS opts out of a SQL query in the collection phase, 
it can still contribute to the parallel computation in the aggregation phase. With a 
traditional distributed key exchange, any TDS disconnected during setup will require 
a new key exchange to take place. With our protocol, each TDS contributes to part of 
the shared secret key, the only requirement is that at least one TDS per 
manufacturer participates in step 1 to contribute to the value ri representing this 
manufacturer.  
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 In terms of performance, this protocol is not a burden because it requires only 2-
round of communications as shown in Figure 11. Furthermore, the first round can be 
combined with the collection phase, helping reduce the protocol to only one phase. 
Note that, even if SSI also possesses a TDS, it still cannot access the key shared 
between TDSs. As stated above, TDS code and content cannot be tampered, even 
by its holder. The only information that SSI in possession of a TDS can see is a 
stream of encrypted tuples [To14b]. 
Similar to PKI, adaptive GKE can be used to exchange keys k1 and k2 in both cases 
of Querier. However, although PKI and GKE are both based on the private/public 
keys in the open context, they differ in the way to generate the shared key. PKI is 
centralized and needs to trust the certification authority (which is a single point of 
attack) to generate the shared key. In contrast, with the adaptive GKE every TDS 
contributes part of the secret to generate the shared key.  
5.3 Prototype: SQL/AA 
In this section, we present our prototype platform and describe how we can 
demonstrate the proposed protocols and their scalability and parallelism, through a 
scenario illustrating a distributed architecture where a SSI connects to various TDSs 
[To14b]. To make the demonstration user-friendly and easy to follow, we use a 
graphical interface (Figure 13) that helps understand the overview of the system and 
how data flows through the system.  
5.3.1 Demonstration Platform 
The Hardware Platform. The demonstration platform is an instance of the 
architecture presented in Figure 3. A PC plays the role of the SSI, listens to 
connections from TDSs, manages the communication between TDSs, runs the 
distributed protocols, stores intermediate results, and shows encrypted data and 
results it receives from TDSs. A number of development boards (Figure 12) 
represent the TDSs and host the client application. This application can open a 
connection to the SSI using an Ethernet connection via a switch. These boards 
exhibit hardware characteristics representative of secure secure devices-like TDSs, 
including those provided by Gemalto (the smartcard world leader), one of our 
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 industrial partners. This board has the following characteristics: the microcontroller is 
equipped with a 32 bit RISC CPU clocked at 120 MHz, a crypto-coprocessor 
implementing AES and SHA in hardware (encrypting or decrypting a block of 128bits 
costs 167 cycles), 64 KB of static RAM, 1 MB of NOR-Flash and is connected to a 1 
GB external NAND-Flash and to a smartcard chip hosting the cryptographic material. 
Other devices used to represent the TDSs are secure devices built by the ZED 
company (Figure 17) that can connect to a host (e.g. a laptop connected to SSI via 
Ethernet) by USB port. The ZED secure devices have the same characteristics as 
the boards: they are equipped with a crypto coprocessor, run the same client 
application to receive encrypted data from the SSI, decrypt data, compute the 
aggregation, encrypt the result, and return the result to the SSI. Because both 
boards and ZED secure device are by design unobservable, they are connected to 
the PC through a COM port used by our demonstration to trace their behavior. 
The Graphical User Interface (GUI). A GUI is used to control the system and show 
what information each actor can see in our system. The GUI is divided into three 
parts: Set of TDSs, SSI, and Querier. The first part shows the (fictional) geographic 
location of the TDSs. The original cleartext distribution is displayed next to it. The 
real distribution will be compared with the distribution of the cyphered data seen by 
the SSI during each protocol. The second part displays the encrypted query that the 
SSI receives from Querier, the encrypted data from the collection phase of each 
protocol and its visualization to compare the difference between protocols. The final 
part consists of a textbox that allows users to input any SQL query and a table to 
display the final cleartext result of the query. 
The test platform selected was an ARM-based development board 
(STM32F217ZGT618). 
Dataset. We use a randomly-generated dataset for the demonstration. We assume 
that the result of the collection phase is stored in an encrypted table and all boards 
and ZED secure devices share the same key to encrypt/decrypt data. The cardinality 
of the encrypted table is one million tuples.  
18 Datasheet available at http://www.st.com/internet/mcu/product/250172.jsp (retrieved on 2012-06-15). 
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Figure 12: STM32F217 test platform 
Algorithms. Our demonstration consists of three proposed protocols (i.e., S_Agg, 
Noise_based, ED_Hist) presented in Chapter 4, plus a Naïve protocol which simply 
uses deterministic encryption without any distribution obfuscation. 
5.3.2 Demonstration Results 
Security. Thanks to the demonstration platform, we can run the three proposed 
protocols, visually show the difference between their distributions, and demonstrate 
how they prevent frequency-based attacks. During the execution of the protocols, the 
platform shows what information (i.e., encrypted data) the SSI can see and 
demonstrate that the SSI cannot extract any meaningful information. 
Performance. the platform also allows to compare the execution times of these 
protocols to demonstrate their performances and show their feasibility (the protocols 
with a small number of TDSs participating in the computation can be executed in few 
seconds for a dataset of one million tuples). At the end of the execution, the plaintext 
result is printed on the TDSs’ side so that audience can compare with the SQL result 
executed on the plaintext table. The audience can also be invited to propose 
aggregate SQL queries to be tested. 
74 
  
Figure 13: Demonstration graphical interface 
Scalability. To show the scalability and parallelism of our system, we can vary the 
dataset’s size and the number of TDSs used in our protocols. First, we run our 
protocol with one TDS, then we increase the number of TDSs to show that the 
execution time experimentally decreases by approximately the same value, 
demonstrating the scalability of the system. During the execution of the protocol, we 
print the encrypted intermediate result that SSI received from TDSs and show that 
they interleave, demonstrating parallel execution.  
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 Chapter 6  
Performance Evaluation 
In this chapter, we propose a cost model to evaluate our protocols using various 
metrics, each representing a different aspect of the system such as execution time, 
data load, and resource consumption.  Then we experimentally conduct unit tests on 
the real hardware that represents the characteristics of a secure device-like TDS. 
The result of these unit tests allows to calibrate the cost model and then to compare 
the performance between protocols. To verify the accuracy of the cost model, the 
final part of this chapter performs the experiment with multiple secure devices 
running in parallel and confronts the results with that of the cost model.   
6.1 Cost Model 
This section proposes an analytical cost model for the evaluation of our protocols. 
We calibrate this model with basic performance measurements performed on a real 
hardware platform (see section 6.2). We also show in section 6.3 that this model is 
accurate when compared to real measures on a real system composed of a set of 
TDSs. Thus the objective of this section is to provide an analytical model to assess 
the efficiency of the deployment of a TDSs based infrastructure for a given 
application without having to set up such a costly experiment. 
The metrics of interest in this evaluation are the following. 
MaxPTDS: The maximum number of TDSs concurrently needed in the computation. 
In different phases of the protocol, the optimal number of TDSs needed for the 
parallel computation varies and can exceed the number of connected TDSs available 
at that time (i.e., demanding resource is greater than available resource), reducing 
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 the parallelism degree. Nonetheless, this value should be considered to measure the 
parallelism level of the protocol. 
LoadQ: Global resource consumption for evaluating a query Q, expressed as the 
total size of data that all TDSs and SSI have to process. This metric reflects the 
scalability of the solution in terms of capacity of the system to manage a large set of 
queries in parallel and/or a large set of TDSs to be queried. It also provides a global 
view of the resource consumption (i.e., the bigger LoadQ, the more resource spent to 
process that data). 
LoadAVG: Average load of all participating TDSs in the computation. While LoadQ 
reflects the global resource consumption, this metric reflects the local resource 
consumption (i.e., how much load that each TDS has to incur locally in average). 
LoadMAX: Maximum load of participating TDSs in the computation. Each TDS that 
participates in the computation incurs different load because the same TDS can 
participate in different steps of the protocol if connection time of that TDS is long 
enough. LoadMAX reflects the possible worst case of load that a TDS can incur. This 
is important to measure the feasibility of the protocol. If LoadMax is too large, maybe 
no TDS will ever connect for long enough. 
LoadBL: Load balance among participating TDSs in the parallel computation. It is 
measured as the ratio of LoadMAX/LoadAVG. It reflects the protocol’s ability to evenly 
divide and deliver the parallel tasks to connected TDSs. 
TQ: query response time, reflecting the responsiveness of the protocol. Since the 
time in the collection phase is application-dependent and is similar for all protocols, 
and since the time in the filtering phase is also similar for all protocols, TQ focuses on 
the time spent on the aggregation phase, which is actually the most complex phase. 
Tlocal: Average time that each participating TDS spends to compute the query. This 
metric reflects the feasibility of the solution because the longer this time, (1) the 
lower the probability that TDS stays connected during this time and (2) the higher the 
burden for an individual to accept participating in distributed queries. 
sRAM: Size of RAM required in each participating TDS for the computation. 
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 The above metrics can be classified into: (i) Local resource consumption, reflecting 
the resource consumed locally in each TDS; (ii) Global resource consumption, 
reflecting the global resource needed for the whole system to answer a query. The 
weight associated to each of these metrics is context-dependent, as discussed in 
Section 6.2. These metrics are computed based on the following main parameters 
which reflect the characteristics and resources of the architecture: 
• Nt total number of encrypted tuples sent to SSI by TDSs (without loss of 
generality, we consider in the model that each TDS produces a single tuple in 
the collection phase, hence Nt reflects also the number of TDSs participating in 
the collection phase); 
• G number of groups; 
• st size of an encrypted tuple (this size depends on the schema of the database, 
number of attributes needed in the query, and size of each attribute); 
• Tt time spent by each TDS to process one tuple (including transfer, 
cryptographic and aggregation time); 
• number of TDSs that participate in the ith partial aggregation phase 
(protocol dependent); 
• α, nNB, nED, reduction factors in the aggregation phase in S_Agg, Noise_based 
and ED_Hist respectively; 
• nf number of fake tuples per true tuple in Noise_based protocols; 
• h average number of groups corresponding to each hash value in ED_Hist.  
In the following sub sections, we detail the cost model for each protocol. 
6.1.1 Secure Aggregation Protocol 
Because the aggregation phase is iterative, the time spent in this phase is the total 
time for all iterative steps. In the first step of this phase, the time required to 
download data from SSI and return temporary result is: ; . 
Similarly, in step i of the aggregation phase, we have. 
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6.1.2 Noise_based Protocols 
Because all tuples belonging to one group may spread over multiple partitions, the 
aggregation phase includes two steps. 
In the first step, each group contains (nf + 1) * Nt / G tuples in average, and we 
assume that there are nNB TDSs handling tuples belonging to one group. The time 
required to download data from SSI and return temporary result in this step is: 
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6.1.3 Histogram-based Protocol 
Let’s h be the average number of groups corresponding to each hash value. By 
applying the Cauchy’s inequality and the same mechanism as in Rnf_Noise, the 
optimal computation time is: 
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Note that this is just a subset of the complete cost model which can be found in the 
technical report [To13]. 
6.2 Performance Evaluation 
This section compares the performance among protocols using the cost model in 
previous section. But the result is first calibrated by using the unit test as below. 
6.2.1 Unit Test 
To calibrate our model, we performed unit tests on the development board presented 
in Figure 14a. This board exhibits hardware characteristics representative of secure 
secure devices-like TDSs, including those provided by Gemalto (the smartcard world 
leader), our industrial partner. This board has the following characteristics: the 
microcontroller is equipped with a 32 bit RISC CPU clocked at 120 MHz, a crypto-
coprocessor implementing AES and SHA in hardware (encrypting or decrypting a 
block of 128bits costs 167 cycles), 64 KB of static RAM, 1 MB of NOR-Flash and is 
connected to a 1 GB external NAND-Flash and to a smartcard chip hosting the 
cryptographic material. The device can communicate with the external world through 
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 USB full speed. The speed in theory is 12 Mbps but the real speed measured with 
the device is around 7.9 Mbps. 
We measured on this device the performance of the main operations influencing the 
global cost, that is: encryption, decryption, hashing, communication and CPU time, 
and put these numbers as constants in the formulas. Figure 14b depicts the internal 
time consumption of this platform to manage partitions of 4KB. The transfer cost 
dominates the other costs due to the network latencies. The CPU cost is higher than 
cryptographic cost because (1) the cryptographic operations are done in hardware 
by the crypto-coprocessor and (2) TDS spends CPU time to convert the array of raw 
bytes (resulting from the decryption) to the number format for calculation later. 
Encryption time is much smaller than decryption time because only the result of the 
aggregation of each partition needs to be encrypted. 
   
   a)       b) 
Figure 14: Hardware device & its internal time consumption 
Other TDSs (e.g., smart meters) may be more powerful than smart secure devices, 
although client-based hardware security is always synonym of low power. Anyway, 
as this section will make clear, the internal time consumption turns out not to be the 
limiting factor. Hence our choice of considering low-power TDSs in this experiment is 
expected to broaden our conclusions. 
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 6.2.2 Performance Comparisons 
In this study, we concentrate on the performance of Group By queries since they are 
the most challenging to compute. We vary the dataset size (Nt varies from 5 to 65 
million), the number of groups (G varies from 1 to 106) as well as the number of 
TDSs participating in the computation as a percentage of all TDSs connected at a 
given time (varying from 1% to 100%). For each study, we fix two parameters and 
vary the others. When the parameters are fixed, Nt=106, G=103,st=16b, Tt=16μs, 
h=5 and the percentage of TDS connected is 10% of Nt. We also compute and use 
the optimal value for all reduction factors as well as for . In the figures, we plot 
two curves for Rnf_Noise protocols, R2_Noise (nf = 2) and R1000_Noise (nf = 1000) to 
capture the impact of the ratio of fake tuples. We summarize below the main 
conclusions of the performance evaluation. A more detailed study is provided in a 
technical report [To13] and in [To14c].  
In what follows, we study each of the aspects of the protocol that seem important. 
We draw conclusions on the use cases for each protocol in section 6.2. 
Parallelism requirement (MaxPTDS). Figure 15a presents MaxPTDS with varied G. 
Since S_Agg does not need too many TDSs for parallel computing, the demand of 
connected TDSs for computation is almost satisfied. Unlike S_Agg, the other 
solutions need a lot of TDSs for the parallel computation, and when G increases to a 
specific point, the available resource does not meet these demands, reducing the 
parallel deployment of these solutions. In Figure 15b, when G is not too big (i.e., 
G=1000), most of the protocols can fully deploy de parallel computation (except 
R1000_Noise). 
Resource consumption (LoadQ). Figure 15c and 15d show LoadQ respectively in 
terms of G and Nt. Not surprisingly, the total load of Noise_based protocols is highest 
because of the extra processing incurred by fake tuples. However, nf depends only 
on Nt, so when G increases, the total load of Noise_based protocols remains 
constant. Other protocols generate much lower and roughly comparable loads. In 
general, in Figure 15d, LoadQ increases steadily due to the increase of Nt. 
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 Maximum load (LoadMAX). The maximum load of a particular TDS is illustrated in 
Figure 15e. In S_Agg, when G increases, due to the increasing size of partial 
aggregation, each TDS has to process bigger aggregation, resulting in the increase 
of LoadMAX. Also, when G increases, the number of participating TDSs decreases, so 
each participating TDS has to incur higher load. For others, when G increases, since 
Nt remains unchanged, the number of tuples in each group decreases and the 
number of participating TDSs increases. Consequently, each TDS processes less 
tuples, and thus LoadMAX decreases. In other words, the parallel level in this case is 
high, reducing the maximum load that a particular TDS incurs. In Figure 15f, when Nt 
increases, the number of participating TDSs also increases proportionally. So, in 
general, the LoadMAX remains stable except a slight increase in R1000_Noise and 
C_Noise. 
Average load (LoadAVG). Figure 15g is the average load of every participating TDS. 
In S_Agg, since the total load stays almost constant and the number of participating 
TDSs declines steeply when G increases, the average load goes up. In the 
R1000_Noiseand C_Noise, the high total load is constant and all available connected 
TDSs participate in the computation when G varies from 103-106, thus every TDSs 
incur the same amount of load. For the rest, LoadAVG decreases when G increases, 
because there is more number of participating TDSs but the total load is almost 
unchanged. In Figure 15h, although C_Noise has higher LoadQ than S_Agg, the 
number of participating TDSs in S_Agg is much less than that in C_Noise, and 
therefore the LoadAVG of C_Noise is less than that of S_Agg. 
Load balance (LoadBL). Figure 15i and 15j present the load balance of solutions. 
Because of the low parallelism, S_Agg is the most unbalanced protocol. R2_Noise 
divides the load evenly among participating TDSs. ED_Hist has worse load balance 
than R2_Noise since each TDS has to process a partition including h groups while in 
R2_Noise a partition composes of only one group. 
Query response time (TQ). Figure 15k shows the impact of G over TQ. In all 
protocols but S_Agg, TQ depends on the total number of tuples in each group (resp. 
bucket for ED_Hist) because all groups (resp. buckets) are processed in parallel. 
Hence, when G increases while Nt remains constant, the number of tuples in each 
group (resp. bucket) decreases and so does TQ. In S_Agg, when G increases, the 
size of each partial aggregation increases accordingly, and so does the time to 
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 process it and in consequence, so does TQ. Figure 15l shows that, for ED_Hist, 
when Nt increases, the number of TDSs which can be mobilized for processing 
increases accordingly, leading to a minimal impact on execution time. This statement 
is true also for Rnf_Noise protocols with the difference that the greater number of 
fake tuples generates extra work which is not entirely absorbed by the increase of 
parallelism. For S_Agg, the number of iterative steps increases with Nt and so does 
TQ. 
Local execution time (Tlocal). Figure 15m and 15n plot the average execution time 
of every participating TDSs varying G and Nt respectively. It shows that all protocols 
benefit from an increase of G except S_Agg. This is due to the fact that, in S_Agg, 
less TDSs can participate in the parallel computation, and therefore each TDS has to 
process a higher load of bigger partial aggregations. Other protocols benefit from the 
fact that the computing load is shared evenly between TDSs.  Figure 15n shows that 
all protocols but Noise_based protocols are insensitive to an increase of Nt again 
thanks to independent parallelism. The bad behavior of Noise_based protocols is 
explained by the fact that the number of fake tuples increases linearly with Nt and 
this increased load cannot be entirely absorbed by parallelism because the number 
of TDSs available for the computation is bounded in this setting by 10% of the 
participating TDSs. 
Throughput. In general, throughput is the amount of work that a computer can do in 
a given period of time. Applied in our case, throughput is measured as the number of 
queries that our distributed system can answer in a given time period, reflecting the 
efficiency of our protocols (cf., Figure 15o and 15p). In Figure 15o, when G increases, 
the number of participating TDSs for each query increases and the execution time for 
each query does not reduce considerably, resulting in the reduction of throughput for 
all solutions. The throughput of S_Agg, however, increases because PTDS reduces 
much faster than the execution time for each query when G increases. In Figure 15p, 
when Nt increases, the throughput remains constant for all solutions due to the 
proportional increase of participating TDSs. The ED_Hist solution has the highest 
throughput because it needs least participating TDSs and shortest execution time for 
each query. For S_Agg, although the response time for each query is long, the PTDS 
is very low, resulting in high throughput. For the R1000_Noise, since it not only 
demands very high number of PTDS (to process fake tuples), but also responses 
slowly for each query, its throughput is worst. 
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 Elasticity issues. A distributed and parallel system is said to be elastic if it can 
mobilize smoothly a variable part of its computing resources to meet run time 
requirements. Figure 15q,r,k measures the elasticity of all protocols by varying the 
computing resource and assessing its impact on TQ. The computing resource is 
materialized here by the number of TDSs which can be mobilized to contribute to a 
given computation. It is expressed by a percentage of the TDSs contributing to the 
collection phase. Figure 15q (resp. Figure 15r, Figure 15k) considers scarce (resp. 
abundant, intermediate) computing resource in the sense that only 1% (resp. 100%, 
10%) of the TDSs contributing to the collection phase contributes to the rest of the 
query computation. Comparing these figures shows that, when the resource is 
scarce, the parallel computation is not completely deployed, resulting in a longer time 
to answer the query and vice-versa. Since S_Agg does not depend on the number of 
available TDSs (but on G and on the memory size of TDS), its performance is not 
impacted by a fluctuation of the resource available. In other words, S_Agg has 
lowest elasticity. 
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Figure 15: Performance evaluations 
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 Memory size. Figure 15s details the memory’s size required for the computation in 
each TDS when G is varied. Because the only factor that impacts the memory’s size 
requirement is G but not Nt, we assess this metric by varying only G. The 
Noise_based solutions require least memory because each partition sent to TDS 
contains tuples belonged to only one group due to the Det_Enc, and thus TDSs store 
only one group in memory regardless of the value of G. The ED_Hist requires more 
memory because each TDS needs to process the partition having the same hash 
value and each hash value corresponds to multiple (i.e., h) groups in the first 
aggregation phase. The S_Agg needs highest memory because each TDS has to 
store the whole partial aggregation (which includes many groups) in the RAM. So, 
when G increases, the memory needed for storing the whole aggregation also 
increases linearly. When G is too big (i.e., G >1000), the sRAM exceeds the actual 
RAM’s size of TDS, and thus S_Agg is not feasible in this case19. 
6.2.3 Comparisons with State of the Art 
In order to provide a baseline comparison in terms of performance (and not security), 
Figure 15t compares the performance of S_Agg, our most secure solution, with 
server-based solutions working on encrypted data. We consider the performance of 
two well-known encryption schemes, a symmetric one (i.e., DES) and a 
homomorphic one (i.e., Paillier [Paillier99]), as measured in [Ge07]. In DES method, 
each value is decrypted on the server and the computation is performed on the 
plaintext. Clearly this method is not a viable solution in our security model, because 
the database server must have access to the secret key or plaintext to answer the 
query, violating the security requirements. In Paillier's method, the secure modern 
homomorphic encryption scheme, which typically operates on a much larger 
(encryption) block size (say 2K bits) than single numeric data values, is used to 
densely pack data values in an encryption block. Then, the database server performs 
the computation directly on ciphertext blocks which are then passed back to a trusted 
agent (i.e., the Key Holder) to perform a final decryption and simple calculation of the 
final result. The strength of this method is due to the dense packing of values to 
reduce the number of modular multiplications and the minimization of the number of 
expensive decryption operations. We refer to the author’s experimentations, which 
19Swapping between FLASH memory and RAM is used in this case 
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 were run on now outdated hardware20, since both methods were implemented in C-
Store21which was run on a Linux workstation with an AMD Athlon-64 2Ghz processor 
and 512 MB memory [Ge07]. We also compare its performance with C-Store using 
no encryption at all. We ran an AVG query varying G and the database size. The 
result (Figure 15t) shows that, with homomorphic encryption scheme (generalized 
Paillier), C-Store runs slightly faster than using DES for encryption due to the saving 
in the decryption cost during execution. It turns out that S_Agg outperforms DES and 
Paillier when the number of grouping attributes is small (i.e., G ≤ 1000) since it can 
exploit the parallel calculation of TDSs to speed up the computation and becomes 
worse after this threshold. 
Although these algorithms are a little dated, the objective is simply to provide a 
baseline comparison, to show the effectiveness of our approach and demonstrates 
the strength of large-scale parallel computation even when modest hardware is 
available on the participant's side. Figure 15t matches this objective explicitly.  
6.2.4 Trade-off between Criteria 
Figure 16 summarizes and complements the experimental results described above 
through a qualitative comparison of our proposed protocols over all criteria of interest 
to perform a choice. 
Each axis can be interpreted as follows. Local resource consumption axis refers to 
Tlocal metrics and compares the protocols in terms of feasibility, i.e., is the resource 
consumed by a single TDS compatible with the actual computing power of the 
targeted TDSs. This question is particularly relevant for low-end TDSs (e.g., smart 
secure devices) and of lesser interest for high-end TDSs. S_Agg is at the worst 
extremity of this axis because the final aggregation must be done by a single TDS 
while ED_Hist occupies the other extremity thanks to its capacity to evenly share the 
load among all TDSs. That also explains why in Load Balance axis ED_Hist better 
balances the load among TDSs than S_Agg. Noise_based protocols are in between 
because they also share the load evenly but at the price of managing a large number 
of fake tuples. Note that the relative position of S_Agg and ED_Hist is reversed in 
20 However, this hardware is still orders of magnitude superior to the secure secure devices we use. 
21 http://db.csail.mit.edu/projects/cstore/ 
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 the Global Resource Consumption and Satisfied Level of Parallel Deployment axis 
which refers to LoadQ and MaxPTDS metrics and compares the scalability of the 
protocols in terms of number of parallel queries which can be computed and their 
ability of fully parallel computation, respectively. Indeed, the total number of TDSs 
mobilized by S_Agg for one single query computation is much smaller than that of 
ED_Hist. Regarding the Responsiveness axis, the relative ordering of S_Agg and 
ED_Hist actually differs depending on G. According to Figure 15, S_Agg outperforms 
ED_Hist for small G (smaller than 10) and is dominated by ED_Hist for larger G.  
Finally, Elasticity axis is a direct translation of the conclusions drawn in Section 6.2 
and Confidentiality axis recalls the conclusion of Section 4.5. 
 
Figure 16: Comparison among solutions 
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 This figure makes clear that Noise_based protocols are always dominated either by 
S_Agg or ED_Hist and should be avoided. However, choosing between the other two 
depends on the application’s characteristics, and Figure 16 should be used to decide. 
Let us consider a first scenario where individuals manage their data (e.g., their 
medical folder) using a secure Personal Data Server embedded in a smart secure 
device-like TDS [Allard10]. In such a scenario, individuals are likely to connect their 
TDS seldom, for short periods of time (e.g., when visiting a doctor) and would prefer 
to save resource for executing their own tasks rather than being slowed down by the 
computation of external queries. According to Figure 16, ED_Hist best matches the 
above requirements. Conversely, let us consider a smart metering platform 
composed of power meter-like TDSs, connected all the time and mostly idle. In this 
case, TDSs’ owners do not care how much resources are monopolized to compute 
queries and the primary concern is for the distribution company to maximize the 
capacity to perform global computation. S_Agg is more appropriate in this case. In 
short, ED_Hist and S_Agg are the two best solutions and the final choice depends 
on the weight associated to each axis for a given application. 
6.3 Performance measurement on real hardware 
To test the accuracy of our proposed cost models given in previous section, we 
compare the values taken from experiments conducted on real hardware with that of 
the cost models.  
6.3.1 Experiment Setting 
This section experimentally verifies the proposed cost models using 20 ZED secure 
devices22 (Figure 18) playing the role of a pool of TDSs used during the processing 
phase (ie. after the collection phase has been performed). The experiment is tested 
on a Centrino Core 2 Duo PC with 2.4 Ghz CPU and 4 GB RAM, playing the role of 
SSI. The 20 ZED secure devices communicate with the PC through USB port (Figure 
17). We verify our cost models on (i) Query response time (TQ), (ii) Resource 
consumption (LoadQ), (iii) Local execution time (Tlocal) and (iv) Load balance (LoadBL) 
22 These secure secure devices are used in different universities and FabLabs in France and will be soon 
distributed under an open-hardware licence. In terms of hardware resources, they share many commonalities 
with the development board described in Section 6.2. 
92 
                                            
 among secure devices. The low number of secure devices has an influence on a 
certain number of results, but overall we believe that our prototype demonstrates that 
the cost model is accurate.  
 
Figure 17: ZED Secure device (front & back) 
The prediction accuracy is measured as the error between actual and estimated 
values in answering a query. Specifically, let act be the actual values when running 
on real secure devices and est be the estimated values when applying our proposed 
cost model, we adopt the following error rate definition [Tao03]: 
 
 
Figure 18: Twenty secure devices running parallel 
93 
 Similar to the performance comparison done with the cost model in the previous 
section, we vary two parameters (i.e., G and Nt) to see its impact to the error rate. 
When Nt varies up to one million, G is fixed at 100, and when G varies from 50 to 
400 groups, Nt is fixed to one million tuples. 
6.3.2 Comparison 
In the following figures, for each metric, the first graph represents the real absolute 
value measured using the 20 ZED secure devices while the second graph 
represents the relative error between these real values and the values predicted by 
the cost model. This second graph captures the accuracy of our cost model.  
The first set of experiments verifies the correctness of the query response time. 
Figure 19a plots TQ varying G. The Noise protocol has the longest execution time 
due to fake tuples, and S_Agg runs longer than ED_Hist since each secure device 
has to process large partial aggregation. This observation is similar to that in Figure 
15k, giving a maximum estimation error under 7% in Figure 19b. When Nt varies, TQ 
increases linearly in Figure 19c, similarly to Figure 15l. However, the increase rate of 
Figure 19c is bigger than that of Figure 15l because in the case of 20 participating 
secure devices, parallelism is not fully deployed due to the limited number of secure 
devices. On the contrary, in Figure 15l where we have many participating TDSs, the 
parallel computation is completely deployed, resulting in a lower increase rate when 
the data load increases.  The maximum error is around 10% in Figure 19d.   
Figures 19 e-h shows the resource consumption error rate. Similar to Figure 15c, all 
protocols in Figure 19e incur constant loads (except a very small increase in case of 
S_Agg) when G varies because the total number of tuples is fixed. This gives a very 
low error rate for ED_Hist and Noise protocols (around 2%) and a rather low error 
rate for S_Agg (less than 8%). Similarly, the variation of Nt yields the linear increase 
of LoadQ in both Figures 15d and 19g, giving an accurate result (around 2%-3% 
error) in Figure 19h.  
Figure 19 i-l depicts the error rate on local execution time. Except the small linear 
increase of S_Agg in figure 19i, Noise and ED_Hist remain constant. This contradicts 
the decreasing trend of Noise and ED_Hist in Figure 15m when G varies. This can 
be explained again by the limited number of secure devices. If the global data load 
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 keeps unchanged, and the number of secure devices remains at twenty, each secure 
device processes the same amount of data in average even when G varies (except 
for S_Agg since the size of the aggregations depends on G). In contrast, when G 
increases in Figure 15m, the number of participating secure devices also increases, 
reducing the average connecting time for each secure device to process less load. 
Notice that when G increases over 1000 in Figure 15m, the Tlocal of C_Noise and 
R1000_Noise also remains constant since the number of connecting TDSs is less 
than the required TDSs to fully deploy parallel computation. We believe this 
explanation reinforces the credibility of our cost model since this trend repeats in 
Figure 19i. When varying Nt, all protocols increase linearly in the experiment (Figure 
19k), while they remain unchanged in the cost model (Figure 15n), except for Noise 
protocols. The reason of this difference is that when the total load increases while 
the number of secure devices remain fixed (Figure 19k), or when the number of 
secure devices increases but does not meet the demand for an optimal parallel 
computing (Noise protocols in Figure 15n), each secure device has to connect longer 
to process a bigger load. This is not the case for S_Agg and ED_Hist in the cost 
model since the increase rate of total load is less than that of connecting TDSs (in 
the cost model we assume that the percentage of connected TDSs is 10% of Nt). 
Figure 19m displays the error rate of load balance among secure devices. Since the 
total load is divided evenly among twenty secure devices, the load balance remains 
at approximately 1 because all twenty secure devices incur nearly the same load, 
yielding extremely accurate prediction (with maximum error less than 2% in Figure 
19n, except for S_Agg). Similarly, when Nt varies in Figure 19o, Noise and ED_Hist 
have better load balance than S_Agg since some secure devices in S_Agg have to 
process big aggregations to produce the final result. This observation conforms to 
the Figure 15j where S_Agg has also the most unbalanced load among protocols. 
As a summary of this section, although we can measure some differences between 
the cost model predictions and the real measurements, the error rate remains 
around few percents and the trends of all graphs in Figure 19 are similar to the 
trends observed in Figure 15. We believe the differences arise mostly from the 
inability to fully deploy the parallel computation due to limited connecting TDSs in the 
experiments.  We plan on experimenting on larger sets of secure devices in the 
future.  
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Figure 19: Performance and error rate 
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 6.3.3 Scalability of the System 
To test the ability of our system to scale up to millions of secure devices in real life 
applications, we measure its speedup when increasing the number of secure devices. 
Specifically, the speedup of our system is measured as follow: 
S(n) = T(1)/T(n) 
with T(n) being the execution time using n secure devices. 
We vary the number of secure devices to measure the execution time in Figure 19q. 
From that, we calculate the speedup when doubling the number of secure devices 
each time 
In Figure 19r, the speedup approaches 12x when we use 16 secure devices. When 
the number of secure devices doubles, the average speedup ratios of S_Agg, Noise 
and ED_Hist are 1.82, 1.81 and 1.83 respectively. These speedup ratios let us 
expect that our system should be able to scale to millions of secure devices (given 
an equivalent increase in power of the SSI) in real applications with reasonable 
execution time and speedup. This result is not surprising considering that all 
protocols exhibit mainly independent parallelism. 
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 Chapter 7  
Trusted MapReduce 
Relational databases were not designed to cope with the scale and agility challenges 
and therefore they are not suitable for big data processing that faces modern 
applications. Previous chapter focuses on SQL-like computation which answers the 
SQL queries and hence cannot tackle the more complex problems such as the 
key/values pair problem. This problem, which is more general than SQL queries, can 
be solved by MapReduce framework efficiently. With scalability, fault tolerance, ease 
of programming, and flexibility, MapReduce is very attractive for large-scale data 
processing. However, despite its merits, MapReduce does not focus on the problem 
of data privacy, especially when processing sensitive data on untrusted 
Mappers/Reducers. This chapter proposes TrustedMR, a trusted MapReduce system 
based on the Trusted Cells with high security assurance provided by tamper-
resistant hardware, to enforce the security aspect of the MapReduce. TrustedMR 
pushes the security to the edges of the network where data is produced and 
encrypted data can be processed mostly on untrusted servers without any 
modification to the existing MapReduce framework. Our evaluation shows that the 
performance overheads of TrustedMR can easily be managed to within only few 
percents, compared to original MapReduce framework that handles cleartexts. 
7.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in previous chapters, personal data most often ends up in the Cloud 
for convenience and efficiency, stored within user’s personal space. New companies 
whose business is to manage user’s personal cloud are appearing, such as the 
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 French company CozyCloud23. But more generally, companies processing sensitive, 
private or confidential data are looking for solutions to secure these operations, while 
still being able to outsource the processing. Thus an important challenge for 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) companies is to be able to propose private and 
secure data management and computing to their users. 
In this chapter, we focus on the MapReduce framework [Dean08]. It stands out as 
being the most popular solution due to its scalability, fault tolerance, ease of 
programming, and flexibility. With MapReduce, developers can solve various 
cumbersome tasks of distributed programming without the need to write complicated 
codes. Indeed, a developer simply writes a map and a reduce function. The system 
automatically distributes the workload over a cluster of commodity machines, 
monitors the execution, and handles failures. Current trends show that MapReduce 
is considered as a high-productivity alternative to traditional parallel programming 
paradigms for a variety of applications, ranging from enterprise computing to peta-
scale scientific computing24. For example, power meter data can be used by the 
national distribution company (e.g., EDF company in France) to enable new services 
and products for customers. The volume of data created by energy networks is 
substantial, leading companies like SunEdison into big data modeling and analytics 
(e.g., going from one meter reading a month to smart meter readings every 15 
minutes results in a huge increase data volume that must be efficiently handled). 
However, the raw data can be highly sensitive: at the 1Hz granularity provided by the 
French Linky power meters, most electrical appliances have a distinctive energy 
signature. It is thus possible to infer from the power meter data inhabitants activities 
[Lam07]. In consequence, raw data cannot simply be directly stored and processed 
on the cloud in the clear: the data must be protected. This means that if data is to be 
processed by the Cloud, it must be encrypted. 
We consider that personal data stores are hosted by secure devices but make no 
additional assumption regarding the technical solution they rely on (except in the 
experiments section). These TDSs are deployed on the Cloud (i.e. plugged into the 
blade servers) in order to manage the processing of the sensitive data. The TDSs on 
23 https://cozy.io/en/  
24 http://skynet.rubyforge.org   
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 the Cloud can either be rented by the customers of the IaaS, or could even be 
provided by the customers themselves, who could in particular provide some specific 
code to run in this secure environment. 
Indeed, MapReduce was born to meet the demand of performance in processing big 
data, but it is still missing the function of protecting user’s sensitive data from 
untrusted mappers/reducers. Although some state-of-the-art works have been 
proposed to focus on the security aspect of MapReduce, none of them aims at data 
privacy. They only solve the problem of integrity verification [Ruan12, Wei09] and 
have some weak security assumptions about untrusted servers (e.g., they require 
that the servers executing the Reducers must be trusted [Roy10]). Furthermore, 
these works often require some modifications to the original MapReduce framework 
to enforce the system’s security (e.g., [Roy10] have to modify the original 
MapReduce framework to support the mandatory access control). 
Based on the Trusted Cells architecture and the protocol proposed in Chapter 4, this 
chapter proposes a MapReduce-based system, addressing the following three 
important issues that every secure system must meet: 
• Security: How to process data using MapReduce framework without revealing 
sensitive information to untrusted mappers/reducers? 
• Utility/Functionality: How many types of operations (e.g., types of SQL 
queries) the proposed system can support? Can the system support key-value 
pair problem? 
• Performance: How to process large amount of encrypted data using 
MapReduce with small overhead, compared with performance in processing 
cleartext data?  
To solve this problem, we consider an approach where sensitive data is produced 
and encrypted locally, then stored on the Cloud in the form of an encrypted data file. 
The processing of this data is done on the Cloud, thus we consider (as in the 
classical MapReduce paradigm) that this encrypted file is the input of the 
MapReduce task. Indeed, to ensure the data privacy, data must be obfuscated 
appropriately so that MapReduce framework can process encrypted data while 
maintaining the privacy. To ensure the utility, we transfer the encrypted data to TDSs 
plugged into the Cloud to decrypt and compute. Since TDSs are able to compute on 
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 the cleartext, this approach can support any functions. To ensure the performance, 
especially when we have to transfer large amount of data to TDSs, we use parallel 
computing where each mapper/reducer splits big data into smaller ones and 
transfers to multiple TDSs so that they can process in parallel, reducing the 
transferring and computing time. 
Hence, the contribution of this chapter is to propose a secure MapReduce-based 
system that can: (1) preserve data’s privacy from untrusted mappers/reducers, (2) 
support unlimited types of operations, key/value pair problems and (3) have 
acceptable and controllable performance overhead.  
7.2 Proposed Solution 
Our solution is the application of ED_Hist protocol into the MapReduce framework. 
We introduce the execution phases of this framework and then explain how to apply 
ED_Hist into it. 
7.2.1 MapReduce Job Execution Phases 
The MapReduce programming model consists of a map(k1; v1) function and a 
reduce(k2; list(v2)) function. The map(k1; v1) function is invoked for every key-value 
pair <k1; v1> in the input data to output zero or more key-value pairs of the form <k2; 
v2>. The reduce(k2; list(v2)) function is invoked for every unique key k2 and 
corresponding values list(v2) in the map output. reduce(k2; list(v2)) outputs zero or 
more key-value pairs of the form <k3; v3>. The MapReduce programming model also 
allows other functions such as (i) partition(k2), for controlling how the map output 
key-value pairs are partitioned among the reduce tasks, and (ii) combine(k2; list(v2)), 
for performing partial aggregation. The keys k1, k2, and k3 as well as the values v1, 
v2, and v3 can be of different and arbitrary types. The detail of map and reduce tasks 
is depicted in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20: Detail execution of map and reduce task [Herodotou11] 
In the next section, we propose a solution so that we do not need to modify this 
original model. We use the encryption scheme to allow the untrusted 
mappers/reducers participate in the computation as much as possible and transfer 
the necessary computations that cannot be processed on server to TDSs. These 
transfer and computation on TDSs happen in parallel to speed up the running time.  
7.2.2 Proposed Solutions 
Our proposed solution inherits the histogram-based solution, called ED_Hist, 
proposed in [To14a]. Informally speaking, to prevent the frequency-based attack on 
deterministic encryption (dEnc for short) that encrypts the same cleartexts into the 
same ciphertexts, and to allow untrusted server group and sort the encrypted tuples 
(that have the same plaintext values) into the same partitions, ED_Hist transforms 
the original distribution of grouping attributes, called AG, into a nearly equi-depth 
histogram (due to the data distribution, we cannot have exact equi-depth histogram). 
A nearly equi-depth histogram is a decomposition of the AG domain into buckets 
holding nearly the same number of true tuples. Each bucket is identified by a hash 
value giving no information about the position of the bucket elements in the domain. 
Figure 21.a shows an example of an original distribution and Figure 21.b is its nearly 
equi-depth histogram. 
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Figure 21: Example of nearly equi-depth histogram 
There are three benefits in using nearly equi-depth histogram: i) allow 
mappers/reducers participate in the computation as much as possible (i.e., except 
the combine and reduce operations, all other operations can be processed in 
ciphertexts), without modifying the existing MapReduce framework; ii) better balance 
the load among mappers/reducers for skewed dataset; and iii) prevent frequency-
based attack. 
The protocol is divided into three tasks (see Figure 20 & 22). 
Collection Task: Each TDS allocates its tuple(s) to the corresponding bucket(s) and 
sends to mappers/reducers tuples of the form (Ƒ(k), nEnc(u)) where Ƒ is the mapping 
function that maps the keys to corresponding buckets. 
bucketId = Ƒ(k) 
and nEnc is the non-deterministic encryption that can encrypt the same cleartext into 
different ciphertext 
Assume the cardinality of k is n, and Ƒ maps this domain to b buckets, then we have 
B1 = Ƒ(k11) = Ƒ(k12)=…= Ƒ(k1d) 
B2 = Ƒ(k21) = Ƒ(k22)=…= Ƒ(k2e) 
… 
Bb= Ƒ(kb1)= Ƒ(kb2)=…= Ƒ(kbz) 
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 From that, the average number of distinct plaintext in each bucket is: 
h = (d + e +…+ z)/b = n/b 
When this task stops, all the encrypted data sent by TDSs are stored in DFS, and 
are ready for processed by mappers/reducers. 
Map Task: This task is divided into five phases: 
1. Read: Read the input split from DFS and create the input key-value pairs: (B1, 
Enc(u1)), (B2, Enc(u2)),… (Bb, Enc(um)). 
2. Map: Execute the user-defined map function to generate the map-output data: 
map(Bi; nEnc(ui)) -> (B’i; nEnc(vi)). If the map function needs process complex 
functions that cannot be done on encrypted data (i.e., vi = f(ui)), connections to 
TDSs will be established to process these encrypted data. 
3. Collect: Partition and collect the intermediate (map-output) data into a buffer 
before spilling. 
4. Spill: Sort, if the combine function is specified: parallel transfer encrypted data to 
TDSs to decrypt, combine, encrypt, and return to mappers, perform compression if 
specified, and finally write to local disk to create file spills. 
5. Merge: Merge the file spills into a single map output file. Merging might be 
performed in multiple rounds. 
Reduce Task: This task includes four phases: 
1. Shuffle: Transfer the intermediate data from the mapper nodes to a reducer's node 
and decompress if needed. Partial merging and combining may also occur during 
this phase. 
2. Merge: Merge the sorted fragments from the different mappers to form the input to 
the reduce function. 
3. Reduce: Execute the user-defined reduce function to produce the final output data. 
Since the reduce function can be arbitrary, and therefore encrypted data cannot be 
executed in reducers, they must be transferred to TDSs to be decrypted, executed 
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 the reduce function, encrypted, and returned to reducers. The difference between the 
output of the reduce function of traditional MapReduce with TrustedMR is that each 
input key represents different cleartext values, so the output key of the reduce 
function also represents different values: (B’1; list(nEnc(v1)) -> (nEnc(k11);  
nEnc(f(v1i))), …,(nEnc(k1d); nEnc(f(v1m))). 
4. Write: Compressing, if specified, and writing the final output to DFS. 
 
Figure 22: Trusted MapReduce execution 
Among all phases in both map and reduce tasks, with the plaintext data mapped 
using the ED_Hist, the existing MapReduce framework can be used without being 
modified because each mappers/reducers can do all operations (i.e, map, partition, 
collect, sort, compress, merge, shuffle) on the mapped data, except the combine and 
reduce function. Since the combine and reduce functions must process on cleartexts, 
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 encrypted data are transferred back to TDSs for decrypting, computing, encrypting 
the result and returning to mappers/reducers. To reduce the overhead of transferring 
large amount of data between TDSs and mappers/reducers, each mappers/reducers 
split the data into smaller pieces and send it in parallel to multiple TDSs. With this 
way, the transferring time is reduced. Below is the pseudocode for map/reduce 
function. 
 
7.2.3 How our proposed solution meets the requirements 
Informally speaking, the security, utility and efficiency of the protocol are as follows 
(the security analysis is on Chapter 4 and we formally prove the efficiency in the next 
section): 
Security. Since TDSs map the attributes to nearly equi-depth histogram, 
mappers/reducers cannot launch any frequency-based attack. What if 
mappers/reducers acquire a TDS with the objective to get the cryptographic material 
(i.e., a sort of collusion attack between mappers/reducers and a TDS)? As stated in 
Chapter 3, TDS code cannot be tampered, even by its holder. Whatever the 
information decrypted internally, the only output that a TDS can deliver is a set of 
encrypted tuples, which does not represent any benefit for mappers/reducers. 
Utility. Since the data is processed by trusted TDSs in cleartext, our solution can 
support any operations. 
method Map (bucket Bi; encrypted value nEnc(ui)) 1. emit(bucket B’i, nEnc(vi))  
method Combine (bucket B’i; list [nEnc(v1), nEnc(v2),..]) 1. form the partition: nEnc(v1), nEnc(v2),..nEnc(vp)  2. create connection and send data to TDSs 
3. in each TDS: 
4.     unmap bucket: Ƒ-1(B’i) -> ki1 , ki2, .., kin 5.     decrypt nEnc(vi) -> vi 6.     compute rij = f(vi) having the same kij 7.     encrypt result rij -> nEnc(rij) 8.     map to bucket: Ƒ(ki1) = Ƒ(ki2) =..= Ƒ(kin) = B’i 9. emit (bucket B’i; nEnc(rij))  
method Reduce (bucket B’i; list [nEnc(rij),..]) 1-7. similar to Combine function from step 1 to 7 
8.  emit (nEnc(kij); nEnc(r’ij))  
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 Performance. The efficiency of the protocol is linked to the parallel computing of 
TDSs. Both the collection task and combine, reduce operations are run in parallel by 
all connected TDSs and no time-consuming task is performed by any of them. As the 
experiment section will clarify, each TDS manages incoming partitions in streaming 
because the internal time to decrypt the data and perform the computation is 
significantly less than the time needed to download the data. By combining the 
parallel computing, streaming data, and the crypto processor that can handles 
cryptographic operations efficiently in TDSs, our distributed model has acceptable 
and controllable performance overhead as pointed out in experiment. 
Beside the three essential requirements above, our proposed solution meets other 
criteria as well: integrability and correctness. 
Integrability: Because we do not need to modify the original MapReduce framework, 
our proposed solution can easily integrate with the existing framework. ED_Hist 
helps mappers/reducers run on encrypted data exactly as if they run on cleartext 
data without modifying the original MapReduce framework (i.e., as pointed out in 
previous sections, the only tasks that mappers/reducers cannot run on encrypted 
data are combine and reduce). 
Correctness. Since mappers/reducers are honest-but-curious, it will strictly follow 
the protocol and deliver to the querier the final output. Unlike the differential privacy, 
mappers/reducers do not sanitize the output (to achieve the differential privacy), so 
the final output is correct. If a TDS goes offline in the middle of processing a partition, 
and therefore cannot return result as expected, mappers/reducers will resend that 
partition to another available TDS after waiting the response from disconnected TDS 
a specific interval. 
7.3 Performance Evaluation 
This section evaluates the performance of our solutions. We first test with the 
development board to see the detail time breakdown on the secure hardware (i.e., 
transfer, I/O, crypto, and CPU cost). Then we use the Z-secure device described 
below, which has the same hardware characteristic with this development board to 
test on the larger scale (i.e., running multiple Z-secure devices in parallel) in the real 
cluster. We also compare the running time on ciphertext and that on cleartext to see 
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 how much overhead incurred. We finally increase the power of the cluster by scaling 
depth (i.e., increase the number of Z-secure devices plugged in each node) and 
scaling width (i.e., increase the number of nodes) to see the difference between the 
two ways of scaling. 
7.3.1 Scaling with parallel computing 
Experimental setup. Our experiment is conducted on a cluster of Paris Nord 
University with 4 nodes. Each node is equipped with 4-core 3.1 GHz Intel Xeon 
E31220 processor, 8GB of RAM, and 128GB of hard disk. These nodes run on 
Debian Wheezy 7 with unmodified Hadoop 1.0.3.  
Figure 23 shows the performance overhead when processing ciphertext over 
cleartext. There is no difference in map time but the reduce time in ciphertext is 
much longer than that of cleartext. This is due to the time to connect to Z-secure 
device and process the encrypted data inside the Z-secure device. In this test, only 
one Z-secure device is plugged to each node. That creates the bottleneck for the 
ciphertext processing because Z-secure device is much less powerful than the node 
that has to wait Z-secure device to process the encrypted data. While the cleartext 
data is processed directly in the powerful node, the ciphertext has to be transferred 
to secure devices for processing. In this way, computation on ciphertext incurs three 
overhead in compared with the cleartext: i) time to transfer the data from node to 
secure device (including the connection time and I/O cost), ii) time to decrypt the 
data and encrypt the result, iii) the constraint on the CPU and memory size of secure 
device for computation inside the secure device. 
To alleviate this overhead, we plug multiple secure devices to the same node and 
process the ciphertext in parallel in these secure devices. Figure 18 shows the 20 
secure devices run in parallel and plugged to the same node. In Figure 23, when the 
number of secure devices plugged to each node increases, the reduce time 
decreases gradually and approaches that of cleartext. Specifically, when the number 
of secure devices increases from 1 to 20, the average speedup is 1.75. So, if we 
plug 32 secure devices to each node, the reduce time will be 5.49 (seconds), which 
gives approximate 10% longer than cleartext.  
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Figure 23: Running time of clear & cipher texts. Scaling depth 
We observe that the overhead is controllable by increasing the number of secure 
devices plugged per reducer. 
7.3.2 Scaling depth versus Scaling width 
In traditional MapReduce, the cluster can be scaled depth by increasing number of 
processors per node or scaled width by increasing number of nodes. In our 
TrustedMR, since it depends on the secure devices for cryptographic operations, we 
scale depth our cluster by increasing the number secure devices (i.e., from 1 to 4) 
plugged to each node. We also scale width by increasing number of nodes (i.e., from 
1 to 4), and then we compare the two ways of scaling. In this test, we also increase 
the size of the dataset (i.e., from 2 million tuples to 4 million tuples) to see how the 
running time varies.  
In Figure 24, when we increase the number of nodes in the cluster and keep the 
same number of secure devices on each node, the reduce time decreases 
accordingly and vice versa. Also, with the same number of secure devices, plugging 
them to the same node or to multiple nodes gives almost no difference in term of 
running time (e.g., the reduce time of 4 nodes with each node having only 1 secure 
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 device is only few percent difference from that of 1 node having 4 secure devices 
plugged). Furthermore, the average speedup of scaling width is 1.74 which is only 
2% different from that of scaling depth (i.e., 1.71). In conclusion, scaling depth yields 
nearly the same performance as scaling width. The only factor that affects the overall 
performance of the cluster is the total number of secure devices plugged to this 
cluster, no matter how they are distributed to each node. 
 
Figure 24: Reduce time for 2 millions & 4 millions tuples 
7.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have proposed a new approach to deal with the problem of 
processing big data using MapReduce while maintaining privacy guarantees. Our 
approach draws its novelty from the fact that (private) user data remains under the 
control of its owner, in a Trusted Data Server. As secure hardware become available 
at any client device, such highly secure and decentralized architectures can no 
longer be ignored. The security is pushed to the edge of the network where data is 
produced, avoiding inherent weakness of the centralized database (single point of 
attack, low cost/benefit ratio). The existing MapReduce framework keeps unchanged 
and the types of supported operations are general. We study their efficiency in terms 
of running time using real secure hardware. The results show the performance 
overhead is acceptable (i.e., can be controlled to few percents when number of 
secure devices plugged to each node is big enough). 
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 Chapter 8  
Conclusion and Future Work 
The massive amount of personal data is generated at a tremendous pace. Citizens 
have no way to opt-out because governments or companies that regulate our daily 
life require them. Administrations and companies deliver an increasing amount of 
personal data in electronic form, which often ends up in central servers at the user 
convenience. Although data centralization has unquestionable benefits in terms of 
resiliency, availability and even consistency of security policies, they must be 
weighted carefully against the privacy risks. 
Decentralized architectures, devised to help individuals better protect their privacy, 
hinder global treatments and queries, impeding the development of services of great 
interest. This thesis is a first attempt to fill this gap. It capitalizes on secure hardware 
advances promising soon the presence of a Trusted Execution Environment at low 
cost in any client device (trackers, smart meters, sensors, cell phones and other 
personal devices). 
The approach promoted in this thesis is part of the KISS Personal Data Server 
Architecture. As described in previous sections, it outlines an individual-centric 
architecture whose aim is to enable secure personal data server and at the same 
time provide control over one’s data with tangible enforcement guarantees.  
This chapter concludes the thesis. We synthesize the work conducted, and close the 
manuscript by opening exciting research perspectives. 
8.1 Synthesis 
We have proposed new query execution protocols to compute general SQL queries 
(without multi-TDS joins) while maintaining strong privacy guarantees. The objective 
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 was not to find the most efficient solution for a specific problem but rather to perform 
a first exploration of the design space. By applying a variety of encryption scheme, 
we proposed three very different protocols and compared them according to different 
axes. The encouraging conclusion is that a good performance/security trade-off can 
be found in many situations.  
As stated in Chapter 1, we address in this thesis the problem of implementing 
privacy-preserving SQL execution on asymmetric architecture based on distributed 
secure device with three main objectives (i.e., Decentralization, Security, and 
Generality). We summarize below how we successfully satisfy these objectives.   
The approaches proposed in this thesis are based on a Trusted Data Server that 
embeds a software suite, allowing it to provide a full-fledged database engine, while 
enforcing the strong privacy guarantee. By using this secure device, each individual 
can autonomously manage his own data, and under his control, without the need of 
a trusted central server. In other words, the Decentralization objective is satisfied.   
To prove the Generality of the system, we built a cost model to evaluate the 
performance of each protocol. The unit test was conducted on a development device 
and its result was calibrated into the cost model to produce the measurement in the 
large scale. We found that the proposed protocols can scale up to nation-wide 
contexts, proving the Generality of the system. To verify the accuracy of the cost 
model, we performed the experiment on multiple secure ZED secure devices running 
in parallel, and compared this result with that of the cost model to get the error rate. 
These experiments have showed the accuracy of the proposed cost model, 
reinforcing our proof of Generality. 
In order to evaluate the Security objective, we used the two concepts of coefficient 
exposure and variance depending on the assumption of attacker’s knowledge about 
dataset. In spite of the difference in the ways to measure the security, these two 
methods give the same conclusion: the more information exposed to supporting 
server to allow him to more actively participate into the computation (and thus the 
less security level), the higher performance we gain, and vice versa.    
Finally, we have shown that these protocols can be integrated in concrete software 
and hardware platforms, thus providing a comprehensive solution to the problem 
tackled in this thesis. 
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 8.2 Perspectives 
We expect that this work will pave the way for the definition of future fully 
decentralized privacy-preserving querying protocols. The work conducted in this 
thesis can be pursued in various directions. We identify below some challenging 
issues and outline possible lines of thought to tackle them. 
Support Multi-TDS Joins 
Privacy-preserving joins referring to Information integration across databases owned 
by multiple entities is important in many applications. It considers the problem of how 
entities compute arbitrary joins function using their data in a secure way such that no 
information – other than the join query results – is revealed.  
While our protocols already support a wide range of queries including joins where 
two joining relations are inside the same TDSs, additional effort is required to support 
joins between several TDSs. It is more complex and time-consuming to execute 
these join query on distributed databases where two tables participating in a join 
query are stored at different TDSs. In future work, we plan on tackling the problem of 
joins between several or more TDSs, to support social network type queries (e.g. 
how many users have at least 10 friends that like "literature"). Such queries convey 
obvious privacy problems, but also add some extra degree of trust, due to the fact 
that there may exist a trust network inside the social network itself. Note that secure 
join protocols could be devised based on recent work on efficient secure intersect 
algorithms using smart cards [Fischlin11]. 
One straightforward solution to perform privacy-preserving multi-TDS joins is to rely 
on the SSI to whom all parties submit their encrypted inputs using deterministic 
encryption. The SSI then computes the join directly on the encrypted data and 
returns the results. This approach is in general easy to implement and efficient. Yet 
deterministic encryption is too vulnerable due to frequency-based attacks to be 
ubiquitously accepted by all TDSs.  
Another approach is based on the secure multi-party computation problem where 
parties collectively perform a computation over their data. Each TDS sends 
encrypted data indirectly to other TDSs through SSI. However, the communication 
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 complexity of this approach is normally too high for them to be practical, especially 
when we consider the unavailability constraint of TDSs in our context. 
A natural question to ask is whether there exist solutions that strike a balance 
between the level of required trust on SSI and performance.  
Extend the Threat Model 
Another important research direction is to extend the threat model to (a small 
number of) compromised TDSs. In this thesis, the important assumption is that the 
microcontroller inside TDS is tamper resistant. However, in reality, TDS still can be 
compromised, though such attack is highly improbable due to its cost and complexity. 
So we must think of a solution to deal with this situation when TDSs can be 
compromised. In previous work, [Allard14] have shown that it is possible to convert 
adapt secure protocols where TDS are unbreakable to secure protocols where a 
small subset are corrupted. 
Solutions can be devised either by clustering the keys so that breaking a TDS allows 
only to decrypt a random subset of the data or by providing detection mechanisms 
so that a compromised TDS is quickly blacklisted. 
The first step of this solution is to detect which TDSs are compromised. Then, the 
second step is to propose the new key exchange protocol that revokes the shared 
key to these broken TDSs, generates the new one, and deliver to TDSs, excluding 
the compromised ones.  
Conduct Performance Study on Large Scale Platforms  
Although the cost model is verified accurately using the real secure hardware, the 
experiment conducted in this thesis is on quite small scale. A further study, therefore, 
will perform the experiment on a very large scale, and put our protocols into practice.  
The on-going deployment of very large TDS platforms (e.g., the Linky power meters 
installed by EDF in France or the growing interest for PCEHR hosted in secure 
secure devices) would enable us to perform the experiment on the larger scale.   
This large scale platform also provides a strong motivation to investigate two future 
works mentioned above. 
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 Support MapReduce with other Architecture  
The MapReduce architecture mentioned in chapter 7 in this thesis consider that map 
and reduce functions are executed in the untrusted Cloud with the help of TDSs 
plugged to mappers/reducers. In this case, TDSs partly participate in the 
computation. A future study will consider the case in which the map and reduce 
functions will be executed entirely inside the TDSs. To do this, we have to extend the 
PlugDB engine so that it can support the MapReduce framework. In this case, the 
challenge is to assert (1) that these functions are safe (since adversary can inject the 
malicious code inside these functions) and (2) that each TDS really executes these 
functions (but not others). 
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